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The Currently Mandated Myopia of Rule
10b-5: Pay No Attention to That Manager
Behind the Mutual Fund Curtain
Kelly S. Kibbie*

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the current state of the Rule 10b-51 right of action
following a constricting trilogy of Supreme Court cases that have rendered it
a myopic remnant of the right previously endorsed by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and hundreds of courts over a
span of numerous decades.2 The Roberts Court’s pronouncement in Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders3 has generated an immense
amount of criticism4 and a slew of conflicting lower court decisions.5 By
effectively abolishing most private Rule 10b-5 claims against secondary actors,6 including lawyers, accountants, credit rating agencies, underwriters and
securities analysts, and by mistakenly including mutual fund investment managers in the class of ordinary secondary actors,7 the Court has chosen a short* My thanks to Professor Lynn A. Stout, Distinguished Professor of Corporate
and Business Law, Cornell Law School; Professor Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; and Professor Allison Hoffman, UCLA
Assistant Professor of Law. © 2013, Kelly S. Kibbie.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
2. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
3. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
4. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part V.
6. The phrase “secondary actors” is used herein to refer to persons or entities
that provide services to or participate in transactions with corporate issuers. See, e.g.,
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF
SECONDARY ACTORS 1 n.1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Study]. As discussed in Part III,
the courts have struggled to determine the standards for the imposition of primary
liability, versus those for secondary liability, with respect to secondary actors under
the securities laws.
7. As discussed in detail below, with respect to a mutual fund investment adviser, the term “secondary actor” is a misnomer. See, e.g., Brief for the United States
of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17, Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339892, at *17 [hereinafter U.S. Janus Amicus Brief] (“Unlike a typical secondary actor such as ‘a lawyer, accountant, or bank,’ an investment
adviser’s unique and close relationship with a mutual fund makes it essentially a corporate insider.” (internal citation omitted)); Brief of Law Professors William A. Birdthistle [Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law], Tamar Frankel
[Michaels Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School
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sighted, ill-reasoned standard that ignores the doctrinal foundations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),8 as well as the practical
realities and traditional bases of mutual fund law and practice.9
Specifically, despite the fact that a typical mutual fund10 has no employees, no office space, no assets other than those it holds for its investors, no
officers that are not also officers of its investment manager, and no involvement in its own day-to-day management (having delegated such management
and investment decisions to its investment manager), the Roberts Court has
mandated that aggrieved investors pursuing private Rule 10b-5 claims must
ignore fraudulent managers and other “mutual fund malefactors,”11 even
of Law], Lyman P.Q. Johnson [Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and
Lee School of Law and LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) School of Law], Donald C. Langevoort [Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center] & Manning G. Warren
III [H. Edward Harter Endowed Chair of Commercial Law, Louis D. Brandeis School
of Law, University of Louisville] as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15,
Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4380234, at *15 [hereinafter Law
Professors’ Janus Amici Brief] (“By labeling themselves taxonomically too remote to
be held liable, petitioners circumvent the substantive fraud-on-the-market analysis set
forth in Stoneridge.”); see also, e.g., infra Part IV. The terms “investment adviser,”
“investment manager” and “manager” are used interchangeably herein. See, e.g.,
infra note 243.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ee (2006).
9. As discussed later, the “lacunae of securities expertise” on the Supreme
Court since Justice Powell’s retirement in 1987 has led to random decisions drawn not
from the complex interplay of the securities laws, but from more general notions, such
as narrow statutory interpretation. See A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts
Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 106, 144 (2011); infra notes 5665 and accompanying text. Further, as evidenced in Janus, the Roberts Court inexplicably disregards the reasoned and well-articulated views of those with the deepest
understanding of the securities laws. See, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note
7, at *13-14; Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *1 (noting that the
Amici were prompted to write due to the potential “significant consequences for all
American shareholders and their investments” and because of their interest “in ensuring a uniform and coherent interpretation of the [1934 Act] and the regulations promulgated thereunder”); see also infra notes 64-65, 186-87 and accompanying text.
Without doubt, said Amici represent some of the finest minds in the area of federal
securities and investment fund regulation.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. Editorial, So No One’s Responsible?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A26
[hereinafter New York Times Editorial], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/06/15/opinion/15wed2.html?_r=0 (noting that Justice Thomas’ Janus opinion “has
made it much harder for private lawsuits to succeed against mutual fund malefactors,
even when they have admitted to lying and cheating[,]” as liability for misstatements
attaches only to “the one whose name the statement is presented under. . . . [E]ven if
the entity presenting the statement is a business trust – basically a dummy corporation
– with no assets, while its owner has the cash.”).
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where they have deceived their fund boards.12 In sum, Janus does real harm:
it potentially allows a deceitful manager to “coordinate all major aspects of a
mutual fund”13 for fraudulent purposes, while it reaps increased fees, hides its
deceit and avoids private Rule 10b-5 liability. This “pay no attention to the
manager behind the mutual fund curtain”14 dictate is untenable and should be
remedied by legislative action.
Janus’ absolution of all but those with “ultimate authority” in private
Rule 10b-5(b) actions is particularly concerning in light of the high volume of
financial frauds during the last decade involving complicit “gatekeepers,” 15
who prioritized their own economic interests over their ethical obligations:
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Global Crossing only begin the long list of
complicit gatekeeper scandals.16 Janus is especially perplexing in light of the
numerous front-page stories of mutual fund adviser misconduct over the last
decade, including scandals involving market timing, late trading, valuation
misconduct and soft-dollar practices.17 Concurrent with these high-profile
frauds, recent years have also witnessed highly-publicized failures of the
SEC, including its failure to discover Bernie Madoff’s estimated $13.2 billion
to $65 billion Ponzi scheme, despite “credible and specific allegations . . .

12. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
13. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *13; see infra note 172,

(discussing the amount of mutual fund control that a manager must exert in order to
perpetrate a market timing fraud).
14. With apologies to the Kansas balloonist’s embarrassing moment in the 1939
film classic that catches him demanding Dorothy et al. to deny his obvious control of
the levers and microphones appearing to enliven the projection of the “Great and
Powerful Oz”. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). Post-Janus, investment advisers potentially have impunity in most private Rule10b-5 suits to demand denial of their obvious control of mutual funds, requiring aggrieved investors
to, in effect, sue the projection.
15. See generally Christopher C. Hines, The Corporate Gatekeeper in Ethical
Perspective, 78 MO. L. REV. 77 (2013). Certain secondary actors are referred to as
“gatekeepers”, as they occupy a vital position between issuers and investors that allows them to prevent wrongdoing in certain circumstances. See, e.g., GAO Study,
supra note 6, at 1 n.1. For an excellent summary of the roles of various secondary
actors in securities transactions, see id. at 11-16.
16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 305, 311-12 (2004);
Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1615 (2010); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders: Only the Supreme Court
Can “Make” a Tree, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (June
29, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capitalgroup-v-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme-court-can-“make”-a-tree/.
17. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *23 (citing Josh Friedman, FleetBoston, B of A to Pay $675 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at C1).
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repeatedly brought to the attention of SEC staff. . . .”18 Without doubt, gatekeepers have also shouldered a significant amount of blame for the recent
financial crisis.19 The Supreme Court’s constriction of the Rule 10b-5 right,
despite this troubling confluence of events, will most surely disadvantage
U.S. investors,20 as further set forth herein, unless remedied by legislative and
administrative action.
This Article discusses the potentially harmful consequences of the
above-referenced trilogy of Supreme Court cases with respect to private investor suits and agency-driven actions, with a particular focus on the effect on
aggrieved mutual fund investors. In light of drastically reduced regulatory
budgets that compromise today’s securities fraud enforcement efforts, this
issue is particularly timely, given that over forty percent of American households own mutual fund shares, generally assuming such investments to be
relatively safe retirement vehicles.21
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Section 10(b) of the 1934
22
Act and describes Rule 10b-523 as promulgated under Section 10(b). Part
III discusses the above-referenced trilogy of Supreme Court cases: Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,24 Stoneridge Invest-

18. OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF
FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME, CASE NO.
OIG-509 1 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf; Christine
Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff, 2009 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 947, 952 (2009) (noting that the loss estimate depends on the calculation
method utilized); id. at 954 n.44.
19. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall
Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial
Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2011) (discussing the challenges associated
with being a gatekeeper for a financial institution).
20. One scholar hypothesizes that, “in the relatively safe and healthy environment of twenty-first century United States, perceived threats to financial welfare are
more salient to most Americans than perceived threats to our physical welfare.” Hurt,
supra note 18, at 950-51. As a result, the criminal sentences of financial fraudsters
are often greater than those of violent felons. Id. at 986. For example, Bernie Ebbers’s twenty-five year sentence was “‘longer than the sentences routinely imposed by
many states for violent crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes such as
serial child molestation.’” Id. at 986 (quoting United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110,
129 (2d Cir. 2006)). Further, Bernie Madoff, a “seventy-one-year-old-man who had
pled guilty quickly and saved the government the burden of a trial” in connection with
his hedge fund Ponzi scheme was sentenced to 150 years in prison. Id. at 949. The
court characterized his actions as an “extraordinary evil.” Id.
21. INV. CO. INST., 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 86 (52d ed. 2012);
see infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text for further discussion of mutual funds.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
24. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,25 and Janus.26 Part IV explores the unique relationship between an investment adviser and a mutual
fund, with a focus on important doctrinal foundations of the Investment
Company Act of 194027 (the “1940 Act”) ignored by the Janus Court. Part V
examines the confusion among lower courts in adjudicating post-Janus cases
and defines certain ambiguities and open questions in current Rule 10b-5 law.
Part VI proposes legislative and regulatory fixes in line with the doctrinal
underpinnings of the 1934 Act and the 1940 Act.

II. STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD AND THE
ROBERTS COURT
This Part provides a brief overview of the securities laws involved in the
subject trilogy of cases. Although § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability is the focus of the Court’s analyses, an understanding of § 20 liability is also important to the discussion. Additionally, a brief summary of the Roberts Court’s
approach to securities-related matters provides a necessary background to
Part III’s trilogy analysis.

A. Overview of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
To address widespread financial abuses after the 1929 stock market
crash, the seventy-third Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (the
“1933 Act”),28 governing initial securities distributions, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),29 governing secondary market distributions.30 The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act (collectively, the “Acts”) “embrace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor.”31 To effectuate this purpose, the Acts
establish an “extensive scheme of civil liability.”32 The SEC and the De-

552 U.S. 148 (2008).
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64.
Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa).
Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ee).
See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 752 (1975)).
31. Id. at 171 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32. Id.; see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983)
(“Indeed, an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing higher
standards of conduct in the securities industry.”). Shortly after the promulgation of
the Acts, Congress passed the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the “Trust Indenture
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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partment of Justice are authorized to institute proceedings and assert penalties
against violators of various provisions.33 Further, private litigants may sue
violators of certain provisions that expressly provide for private rights of action.34 Private litigants may also sue violators of certain statutes pursuant to
judicially-created private rights of action found to be implied by such provisions.35 The Supreme Court has historically stressed the importance of private antifraud securities actions in supplementing government criminal and
civil enforcement proceedings.36 Further, the Supreme Court has admonished

Act”), the 1940 Act, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”),
providing additional enforcement powers to the SEC.
33. See, e.g., Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171; GAO Study, supra note 6, at 26.
The SEC is authorized to bring civil actions in both administrative and court proceedings seeking injunctive relief, disgorgement orders, civil penalties and orders barring
individuals from the securities industry, among other types of relief. GAO Study,
supra note 6, at 26. The Department of Justice is authorized to impose criminal sanctions under the securities laws of up to $5 million in penalties for individuals, $25
million in penalties for corporations, and up to 20 years imprisonment. Id. at 27.
34. See infra note 88.
35. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-35
(1964)). For an excellent discussion of private express and implied rights under the
1933 Act and 1934 Act, see Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory and Compliance
Professional (CRCP) Program (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov
/news/speech/2011/spch110811ebw.htm. Implied private rights of action under the
1934 Act have been recognized under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder (prohibiting
fraudulent conduct and material misstatements and omissions); § 13(d) (listing reporting requirements with respect to the acquisition of five percent or more of any class of
equity securities); § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 thereunder (prohibiting misstatements or
omissions in proxy materials); § 14(e) (prohibiting misstatements and omissions in
connection with tender offers); and § 29(b) (prohibiting contracts made in violation of
the 1934 Act or rules promulgated thereunder). Robert F. Serio & Aric H. Wu, Basic
Claims Under the Federal Securities Laws, in SECURITIES LITIGATION § 2.2.2[A]
(Practicing Law Institute, ed., 2011).
36. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *24 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308, 313 (2007)) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 369 (1995)); see also, e.g., Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 174 n.10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Then-Commissioner Elisse B. Walter of the SEC explained:
. . . I believe strongly that the public, Congress,
courts, and even the securities bar do not fully
appreciate the interrelationship between public and private enforcement. The impact of
changes in the parameters or existence of private actions on the enforceability of the federal
securities laws is simply not well understood.
And yet, it is critical to investors, our securi-
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“that the statute should be construed not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”37
Section 10(b)38 embodies the “general antifraud provision of the 1934
Act.”39 In 1942, pursuant to authority granted under § 10(b), the Securities

ties markets, and our economy overall that
these laws remain fully enforceable. . . .
. . . [T]he trend away from private rights of action under the securities laws has placed more
and more pressure on the Commission and
other regulators to be the sole guardians of the
statutes. . . . If private rights are cut back further, or further constrained, that puts an increasing burden on already scarce governmental resources.
Walter, supra note 35 (emphasis added) (noting that there are also limitations on the
SEC’s authority, including the fact that the SEC can’t seek damages and thus “cannot
necessarily make the victims whole”).
37. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *21. This flexibility is
especially important with respect to unsophisticated, individual investors. See, e.g.,
Jennifer O’Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 10b-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 521,
525 n.21 (2008) (noting that an overwhelming forty six percent of individual investors
believed that any losses in their stock market investments were insured by the government or a quasi-governmental agency, and twenty two percent were not sure if
they were insured or not) (citing APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, NASD
INVESTOR LITERACY RESEARCH: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2003), available at
www.nasd.com/web/groups/inv
_info/documents/investor_information/nasdw_01
1459.pdf).
38. Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . .
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
39. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171.
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and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgated Rule 10b-5,40 which further
delineates prohibited fraudulent activities.
The judicially-recognized Rule 10b-5 private right of action, “a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn,”41 was established long ago and has been consistently recognized by the courts.42 Because Congress has not provided any guidance regarding a Rule 10b-5 private
right of action, 43 the courts “have had ‘to infer how the 1934 Congress would
have addressed the issue[s] had the 10b-5 action been included as an express
provision in the 1934 Act.’”44 Without doubt, a private litigant may not sue
under Rule 10b-5 for acts that are not prohibited by § 10(b).45 As the Supreme Court explained, “our cases considering the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b) in private suits have emphasized adherence to the statutory

40. Id. at 172. Rule 10b-5 provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact
necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (emphasis added).
41. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
42. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct.
2296, 2302 (2011); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 165 (2008); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971).
43. Although Congress has not specifically codified this judicially-created right
of action, it has implicitly endorsed it on several occasions. See, e.g., infra note 110
and accompanying text.
44. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs
Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993)).
45. Id.
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language, ‘[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute.’”46
To prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a private plaintiff must prove the following elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission
and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation
or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”47 Significantly, in an
enforcement action brought by the SEC, neither reliance nor loss need be
demonstrated.48

B. “Controlling Person” Liability under §20 of the 1934 Act
Congress also expressly provided for secondary liability of “control persons”49 under § 20 of the 1934 Act.50 It is important to note a few instances
46. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)).
47. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 n.3 (citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157).
48. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 133 (citing Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d

1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549-51 (3d Cir.
1998)). In Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), the
Court held that Rule 10b-5 was applicable only to U.S. securities transactions. See,
e.g., Ted Farris, Limiting Primary Rule 10b-5 Liability for Offering Document Misstatements to the Person with Ultimate Authority over the Statement, DORSEY.COM
(July 21, 2011), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_corp_janus_72011/. However, Congress
responded after Morrison with § 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of titles 12 & 15 of the U.S. Code), which
confirmed the SEC’s authority to bring § 10(b) enforcement actions in matters involving non-U.S. transactions. See, e.g., Walter, supra note 35. With respect to private
rights, Congress enacted § 929Y requiring the SEC to conduct a study and solicit
comment regarding the extension of 1934 Act antifraud remedies to non-U.S. transactions. See, e.g, id.
49. Although “control” is not defined in § 20, Rule 405 under the 1933 Act defines “control” as follows:
The term control (including the terms controlling, controlled by and under common control
with) means the possession, direct or indirect,
of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012) (emphasis added); see GAO Study, supra note 6, at 29-30
(noting that “the determination of whether control exists depends on the particular
factual circumstance of each case”).
50. Section 20 provides in pertinent part:
(a) . . . Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
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provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable (including to
the Commission in any action brought under
paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title [providing for injunctive relief and civil
penalties]), unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation
or cause of action.
(b) . . . It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing
which it would be unlawful for such person to
do under the provisions of this chapter or any
rule or regulation thereunder through or by
means of any other person.
....
(e) Prosecution of persons who aid and abet
violations [ – ]For purposes of any action
brought by the Commission under paragraph
(1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title [providing for injunctive relief and civil penalties],
any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person
in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of
any rule or regulation issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such
provision to the same extent as the person to
whom such assistance is provided.
15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006) (emphasis added). It should be noted that other securities laws
also provide for control person liability. For example, § 15 of the 1933 Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to
or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
controls any person liable under sections 77k
or 77l, [§§ 11 or 12] shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist.
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in which § 20 would not provide an avenue of redress for an aggrieved investor. First, in order to establish liability of a “control person” under § 20(a),
the liability of the “controlled person” must be established. As articulately
discussed by the Janus dissent,51 § 20(a) would be inapplicable in the case of
an actor exploiting an innocent intermediary.52 Second, it is currently uncertain whether entities acting through innocent intermediaries are liable under §
20(b).53 Finally, § 20(e), added in 1995,54 only applies with respect to actions
brought by the SEC.55

C. A Note on the Court
Since Justice Powell’s retirement in June 1987,56 there has been no
member of the Supreme Court with a background in securities law.57 This
twenty-six year void stands in contrast to the fifty years following the enactment of the Acts, when there was usually at least one Justice with expertise in
the area.58 This gap in the securities arena has led to random decisions drawn
not from the complex interplay of the securities laws and the financial markets, but from more general notions, such as narrow statutory interpretation
Id. § 77o; see also, e.g., 15. U.S.C. § § 80a-47 (§ 48 of the 1940 Act), 80b-3, 80b-8(d)
(§§ 203 and 208(d) of the Advisers Act).
51. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
52. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. See infra Part V.E.
54. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67,
§104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78t(e)). In 2010, Congress
revised § 20(e) to increase the SEC’s authority to bring actions against those who
merely act recklessly, in addition to those who act with knowledge. H.R. Rep. No.
111-517, § 929O (2010); see also, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 133 n. 193.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t. After Janus, the SEC’s efforts to pursue aiders and
abettors will be hindered if there is no primary violator. See infra notes 215-19 and
accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Powell Dies at 90,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national
/longterm/supcourt/stories/powell082698.htm.
57. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 106; see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J.
841, 847 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell].
58. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 106. Justice William O. Douglas, former
chairman of the SEC, and Justice Powell, a practitioner before his time on the Court,
were the only two securities lawyers to serve on the Court since the enactment of the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act. See Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, supra note 57, at
847. Justice Douglas served on the Court from 1939 to 1975. See William O. Douglas, OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHI.-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/justices
/william_o_douglas/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). Justice Powell served from 1972 to
1987. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHI.-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/lewis_f_powell_jr (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
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and legislative history.59 As discussed below in Part IV the Court’s seeming
lack of understanding of the complexities of the mutual fund/adviser relationship has caused “real damage.”60
Paradoxically, a disproportionately large 2.6% of the cases heard by the
Roberts Court during its first six years (2005-2011) were securities-related, in
contrast to 0.7% heard by the New Deal Court (1936-1954), 0.5% heard by
the Warren Court (1954-1969), 1.3% heard by the Burger Court (1969-1986),
and 0.9% heard by the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005).61 The Roberts Court
has come to be known by many analysts as a “pro-business” Court, with dramatic increases from previous Courts in its percentage of rulings for business

59. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 108, 144 (“When one turns to the substance of
the opinions written in these cases, one finds little effort to grapple with the relation
between the financial markets and the securities laws.”); see also id. at 138 (“Janus
provides additional evidence of the Roberts Court’s lack of engagement with the
securities laws. Only Sections 20(b) is [sic] mentioned in the majority’s opinion, and
then only in a footnote. Neither the majority, nor the dissent, grapples with the complicated regulatory overlap of the securities laws to determine precisely what is given
up by liming the Rule 10b-5 cause of action.”).
60. Gordon, supra note 16 (detailing the degree of an adviser’s control over a
mutual fund and noting that the Court could have avoided the “collateral damage”
created by Janus by basing its decision on loss causation grounds); see also, e.g.,
Stephen Juris, Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2011, 11:51 AM), http:
//www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2011/09/21/janus-capital-group-inc-v-first-derivativetraders-and-the-law-of-unintended-consequences/ (discussing the Janus aftermath,
which has had a deleterious effect on numerous SEC actions in the lower courts, and
lamenting the fact that “broadly worded decisions in the private securities litigation
context can result in unintended – and likely unanticipated – problems for regulators”). As discussed herein, it remains to be seen how much damage the Janus decision will have on the fight against fraudulent activity in the U.S. capital markets.
61. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 107 (“That increase suggests the Justices have
taken a new interest in the field, despite the lack of a Justice with a background in
securities law.”). The Roberts Court has issued numerous decisions regarding the
PSLRA, enacted in 1995, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (the
“SLUSA”), enacted in 1998. See id. at 108.
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interests.62 Its rulings carving away the private Rule 10b-5 right have most
definitely been pro-business and anti-investor.63
Another defining characteristic of the Roberts Court has been its cavalier attitude towards the SEC’s positions in numerous cases.64 This attitude is
in stark contrast to the New Deal Court’s absolute respect for and deferral to
the SEC. As noted by one Supreme Court scholar, “the expertise of the SEC
was a bedrock belief among the New Deal alumni that Roosevelt appointed to
the Supreme Court.65 Such judicial deference resulted in frequent victories
for the SEC during its first forty years.66 The Court’s brusque dismissal of the
SEC’s interpretations in the cases discussed below is illustrative of this shift
in ideology.

III. THE TURNABOUT TRILOGY
A. Central Bank
In 1994, the Supreme Court handed down its 5-4 decision in Central
Bank, which abolished private aiding and abetting liability under §10(b) of
the 1934 Act.67 The decision was extremely controversial, because it overturned “hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every [c]ircuit
in the federal system.”68 Indeed, “all 11 Courts of Appeals to have consid62. Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts.html ?pagewanted=all (citing a study by scholars at Northwestern University and the University
of Chicago analyzing 1,450 decisions since 1953, finding that the Roberts Court ruled
in favor of business litigants in sixty one percent of cases, compared with Courts since
1953 that have made pro-business rulings in forty two percent of cases). The study
also found that the percentage of cases involving business interests has grown during
the Roberts years. Id. However, some legal scholars assert that “[i]f the court favors
business . . . it is as part of a broader orientation toward free markets and a wariness
of many kinds of lawsuits.” Id.; see also, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 142-43.
63. See, e.g.,Walter, supra note 35 (“Despite the broad sweep of the [PSLRA], to
this day the Supreme Court continues to demonstrate what I would characterize as
hostility toward private rights.”).
64. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 117; see also infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
65. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 117 (footnotes omitted).
66. Id.
67. 511 U.S. 164, 191-92 (1994). The majority opinion was written by Justice
Kennedy, with Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas joining. Id. at 166.
Justice Stevens wrote for the dissent, with Justices Blackmun, Souter and Ginsberg
joining. Id.
68. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Notably, because the private aiding and
abetting cause of action was so well-settled,
“[P]etitioner assumed the existence of a right
of action against aiders and abettors, and
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ered the question have recognized a private cause of action against aiders and
abettors under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”69

1. Central Bank Background
Central Bank served as indenture trustee for bond issuances in 1986 and
1988 by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (the
“Authority”).70 The bond covenants required the bonds to be secured by
landowner assessment liens on property with a value of at least 160% of the
outstanding principal and interest of the bonds.71 Pursuant to the bond covenants, AmWest Development (“AmWest”) was required to give Central Bank
an annual report evidencing that the 160% test was satisfied.72
In early 1988, AmWest delivered to Central Bank an appraisal of the
land securing the 1986 bonds and of the land that was proposed to secure the
1988 bonds.73 However, the 1988 appraisal showed virtually no change in
the values set forth in the 1986 appraisal.74 The senior underwriter of the
1986 bonds thereafter sent a letter to Central Bank expressing concern that
the 1988 appraisal was inaccurate, as local property values had declined, and
that the 160% was not being satisfied.75 Following an exchange of correspondence between Central Bank and AmWest, Central Bank agreed to postpone conducting an independent review of the appraisal until late 1988, six
months after the closing on the June 1988 bond issue.76 The Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds before the independent review was completed.77
Respondents, purchasers of $2.1 million of the 1988 bonds, sued several
defendants alleging primary violations of §10(b) and also sued Central Bank,

sought review only of the subsidiary questions
whether an indenture trustee could be found liable as an aider and abettor absent a breach of
an indenture agreement or other duty under
state law, and whether it could be liable as an
aider and abettor based only on a showing of
recklessness.”
Id. at 194. However, “the Court sua sponte directed the parties to address a question
on which even the petitioner justifiably thought the law was settled, and reache[d] out
to overturn a most considerable body of precedent.” Id. at 194-95.
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 167 (majority opinion).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 168.
77. Id.
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alleging secondary liability under §10(b) for aiding and abetting the fraud.78
The lower court granted Central Bank’s motion for summary judgment, and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.79

2. The Decision
The issue before the Supreme Court in Central Bank was whether aiding
and abetting liability could be imposed under §10(b).80 Recognizing that the
definition of conduct prohibited by §10(b) must be controlled by the statutory
text, the majority prefaced its highly controversial opinion: “That bodes ill for
respondents, for ‘the language of Section 10(b) does not in terms mention
aiding and abetting.’”81
Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it
chose to do so. If…Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and
‘abet’ in the statutory text. But it did not.82
The Court rejected the argument by respondents and the SEC that the
phrase “directly or indirectly” in §10(b) covers aiding and abetting liability,
explaining that “aiding and abetting liability extends beyond persons who
engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and abetting liability
reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who
give a degree of aid to those who do.”83 Because §10(b) prohibits only conduct that is manipulative or deceptive, the majority opined that there can be
no liability for acts merely involving the provision of aid to persons committing manipulative or deceptive acts.84 “We cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within
the meaning of the statute.”85
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 175 (citing Brief for the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 8, Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (No. 92-854), 1993 WL
13006275).
82. Id. at 176-77 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 176. The majority cited numerous provisions in the 1934 Act using the
phrase “directly or indirectly” that do not impose aiding and abetting liability. Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(2)(C) (direct or indirect stock ownership), § 78i(b)(2)-(3)
(direct or indirect option, put, call, straddle or privilege interest), § 78m(d)(1) (direct
or indirect beneficial ownership), § 78p(a) (direct or indirect beneficial ownership), §
78t (direct or indirect control of violator of the 1934 Act)).
84. Id. at 177. Importantly, respondents conceded that Central Bank had not
committed a manipulative or deceptive act. Id. at 191.
85. Id. at 177-78.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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Holding that the language of the statute resolved the case, the majority
stated that it would have reached the same conclusion even if the language
had not been determinative by analyzing how the 1934 Congress would have
resolved the issue. 86 If Congress had enacted an express private right of action in § 10(b), the majority reasoned, that right would be similar to other
express private rights of action in the Acts; thus, interpretive guidance with
respect to §10(b) is obtainable by analyzing other express rights enumerated
in the Acts.87
Because private aiding and abetting liability was not included in any of
the express causes of actions under the Acts, 88 the majority concluded that
86. Id. at 178.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 179 (citing Ch. 38, §§ 11, 12, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); Ch. 404, §§ 9, 16, 18,

20A, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)). Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act allows a private suit for
registration statements containing untrue statements or omissions of a material fact
against the following enumerated persons:
1. every person who signed the registration
statement;
2. every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in
the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of
the registration statement with respect to which
his liability is asserted;
3. every person who, with his consent, is
named in the registration statement as being or
about to become a director, person performing
similar functions, or partner;
4. every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or
any person whose profession gives authority to
a statement made by him, who has with his
consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or
as having prepared or certified any report or
valuation which is used in connection with the
registration statement, with respect to the
statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
5. every underwriter with respect to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (2006)). Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act provides a private
right of action against any person who “offers or sells a security in violation of section
5” of the 1933 Act (which sets forth “gun-jumping” violations and prospectus requirements) or who “offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral
communication” that includes an untrue statement or omission of material fact. Id. §
77l(a)). It should be noted that investors in offerings that are exempt from registration
under Regulation S (certain non-U.S. offerings) or under § 4 of the 1933 Act (for
example, § 4(2) private placements or Rule 144A qualified institutional buyer offer-
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“Congress likely would not have attached aiding and abetting liability to
§10(b) had it provided [an express] private §10(b) cause of action.”89 The
majority rested its analysis on its belief that permitting such a cause of action
would allow petitioners to circumvent the required element of reliance.90
Respondents and some amici argued that, because liability for aiding
and abetting was “well established in both civil and criminal actions by
1934,” Congress intended that such liability be incorporated into the 1934
Act.”91 The majority rejected this argument in light of Congress’ “statute-bystatute approach to civil aiding and abetting liability” and its enactment of
§20 imposing secondary liability with respect to control persons.92 [W]hen
Congress wished to create such [secondary] liability, it had little trouble doing so.”93 Similarly, the majority rejected arguments that Congress’ failure to
revise §10(b) after courts began imposing aiding and abetting liability thereunder illustrated congressional intent to impose such liability.94 It concluded
that mere inaction by Congress could not amend a formally enacted statute, 95

ings) may not sue under § 11 or § 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. See, e.g., Farris, supra
note 48.
Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides for a private right of action against
persons engaging in manipulative acts, such as wash sales and matched orders. 15
U.S.C. § 78i(e); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act allows
a private action by the issuer of a security against directors, officers, or beneficial
owners of more than ten percent of any class of any registered equity security who
engage in short-swing trading. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act
allows a private right of action against “[a]ny person who shall make or cause to be
made any statement” that “was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact” in any document filed with the SEC. Id. § 78r(a). Finally, § 20A, which was enacted in 1988,
provides for a private right of action against persons engaging in insider trading activities. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1; Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179.
Additionally, § 15 under the 1933 Act and § 20 of the 1934 Act provide for
control person liability. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. Control person liability under § 15 of the 1933 Act is limited to cases involving a primary violation of §§ 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act. See, e.g, GAO Study, supra note 6, at 29.
89. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179-80.
90. Id. at 180.
91. Id. at 180-81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brief for the Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 81, at 10).
92. Id. at 181-85.
93. Id. at 184 (alteration in original) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 662, 650
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 185-88.
95. Id. at 186 (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (“[W]e
walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle”).
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reasoning that “several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such
inaction.”96
In a well-written dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized that “judges closer
to the times and climate of the 73d Congress than we concluded that holding
aiders and abettors liable was consonant with the Exchange Act’s purpose to
strengthen the antifraud remedies of the common law.”97 Explaining the
Court’s change across time in its approach to implied causes of action, Justice
Stevens explained:
Our approach to implied causes of action, as to other matters of
statutory construction, has changed markedly since the . . . Exchange Act’s passage in 1934. At that time, and indeed until quite
recently, courts regularly assumed, in accord with the traditional
common-law presumption, that a statute enacted for the benefit of
a particular class conferred on members of that class the right to
sue violators of that statute.98
Noting that none of the cases relied upon by the majority with respect to
its strict interpretation of §10(b) “even arguably involved a settled course of
lower court decisions,” Justice Stevens asserted that a “settled construction of
an important federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress
so decides.”99 “[W]e should also be reluctant to lop off rights of action that
have been recognized for decades, even if the judicial methodology that gave
them birth is now out of favor.”100
Countering the majority’s refusal to confer meaning with respect to
Congress’ inaction,101 the dissent noted that, in its comprehensive amendments to the 1934 Act in 1975, “Congress left untouched the sizeable body of
case law approving aiding and abetting liability in private actions under
96. Id. at 187. The majority also rejected policy arguments asserted by the SEC,
stating that policy considerations cannot take precedence over the interpretation of the
statutory text and structure, “except to the extent that they may help to show that
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result ‘so bizarre’ that Congress
could not have intended it.” Id. at 188 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S.
184, 191 (1991)).
97. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 195. The dissent further explained, “In light of the encompassing language of § 10(b), and its acknowledged purpose to strengthen the antifraud remedies
of the common law, it was certainly no wild extrapolation for courts to conclude that
aiders and abettors should be subject to the private action under § 10(b).” Id. at 19899, 199 n.9 (noting that the Court had recognized a private right of action against
secondary actors absent a provision specifically including them in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394 (1982)).
99. Id. at 196, 196 n.6 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 201.
101. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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§10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”102 Such amendments “emerged from the most
searching reexamination of the competitive, statutory, and economic issues
facing the securities markets, the securities industry, and, of course, public
investors, since the 1930’s.”103 Further, the SEC “has consistently understood §10(b) to impose aider and abettor liability since shortly after the rule’s
promulgation.”104
The Court’s conclusion is particularly relevant with respect to the Janus
analysis:
The absence of §10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free
from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on
which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a
primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for
primary liability under rule 10b-5 are met. In any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators; in
this case, for example, respondents named four defendants as primary violators.105

3. Legislative Response to Central Bank
As recognized by the Central Bank dissent, the opinion left little doubt
that even the SEC could not pursue aiders and abettors under §10(b) and Rule
10b-5.106 The opinion instigated petitions for Congress to enact a statutory
cause of action for aiding and abetting liability, and the Senate held hearings
on the issue within a month of Central Bank’s release.107 The Chairman of
the SEC at the time, Arthur Levitt, testified before the Senate Securities Subcommittee and recommended enacting a private right of action for aiding and
abetting liability.108 Members of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities also
supported a private right of action.109 Congress declined to do so,110 but in-

102. Id. at 197.
103. Id. at 197 n.8 (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,

385 n.20 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. at 198 (citing Reves, 494 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
105. Id. at 191 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 199 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158, 173
(citing S. Rep. No. 104-98 at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679).
108. Id. at 158 (citing S. Hearing No. 103-759, at 13-14 (1994)).
109. Id. at 173-74, 174 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing views of Senators
Dodd, Sarbanes, Boxer and Bryan).
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stead enacted §20(e) of the 1934 Act, as part of the PSLRA,111 enabling the
SEC to pursue injunctive relief and civil penalties against aiders and abettors.112 Section 20(e) was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to relax
the previous “knowledge” state of mind requirement to recklessness.113
After the Enron scandal became public in late 2001, legislation was once
again proposed, but not enacted, to restore private aiding and abetting liability.114 Further, neither the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SarbanesOxley”)115 nor the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 did anything to restore preCentral Bank private aiding and abetting liability.116 The Dodd-Frank Act
110. It is interesting to note that the 1995 (pre-2008 financial meltdown, preEnron, pre-WorldCom . . .) Congress chose not to enact private Rule 10b-5 aiding and
abetting liability, while all Circuits before Central Bank assumed that the 1934 (post1929 Crash, mid-Great Depression) Congress intended such liability. See supra note
68.
111. The PSLRA was enacted to weed out frivolous securities lawsuits by requiring, among other things, heightened pleading requirements and an automatic discovery stay. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified with amendments
throughout 15 U.S.C.); see, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 109. For an excellent
summary of the PSLRA, see the GAO Study, supra note 6, at 18-22. The Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) preempts certain state law securities fraud class actions and was designed to prohibit plaintiffs from circumventing the
requirements of the PSLRA. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified
with amendments throughout 15 U.S.C.); see, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 22-23
(providing a summary of the SLUSA); Pritchard, supra note 9, at 109-10. Congress
also enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) in 2005, which provides federal
court jurisdiction and minimum diversity requirements with respect to class actions
with 100 or more petitioners. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified
throughout 28 U.S.C); see also, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 23.
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006); see supra note 50 and accompanying text; see
also, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.
113. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929O, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see, e.g., DAN L. GOLDWASSER, M.
THOMAS ARNOLD & JOHN J. EICKEMEYER, ACCOUNTANT’S LIABILITY § 5.8.2, at 5-125
to -126 (2011).
114. See, e.g., GOLDWASSER, ARNOLD & EICKEMEYER, supra note 113, at 5-125 to
-126 (discussing the Accountability for Accountants Act of 2002, H.R. 3617, 107th
Cong. § 3 (2002); Comprehensive Investor Protection Act, H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. §
14 (2002); the Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2002, H.R. 3829,
107th Cong. § 3 (2002); Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 1933, 107th Cong. § 3).
Bills were also introduced in 2009 by Senator Arlen Specter and in 2010 by Representative Maxine Waters that provided for secondary liability in securities fraud actions. See Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S.
REP. NO. 1551 (2009); Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of
2010, H.R. 5042, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Susan E. Hurd & Elizabeth P. Skola,
Stoneridge: Closing the Door on Expansive Section 10(b) Liability Theories, in 27
SECURITIES LITIGATION: FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1.3 (2012).
115. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
116. See, e.g., GOLDWASSER, ARNOLD & EICKEMEYER, supra, note 113, at 5-126.
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did require the Comptroller of the United States to issue the GAO Study,
which has had little, if no, effect on legislators to date.117

B. Stoneridge
After Central Bank’s ban on aiding and abetting liability, conflicting
approaches to “scheme liability” evolved in the courts as plaintiffs asserted
that secondary actors participating in fraudulent schemes were primarily liable under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).118 Fourteen years after Central Bank, the
Roberts Court delivered its 5-3 decision in Stoneridge, which further restricted the Rule 10b-5 private right of action.119

1. Stoneridge Background
Petitioner, representing a class of purchasers of stock (“Investors”) issued by Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”), a cable operator, filed suit
alleging that Charter violated §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by inflating its reported
revenues by approximately $17 million in order to hide an expected cash flow
deficiency of $15 to $20 million.120 According to Investors, Charter enlisted
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola (the “Suppliers”), its suppliers of digital cable converter boxes (also known as “set-top boxes”), to alter the terms of their
contractual arrangements with Charter so that Charter’s financials would
meet expectations.121 Specifically, Charter and Suppliers agreed that Charter
would overpay Suppliers by $20 for each set-top box until year-end and that
Suppliers would return such overpayment though their purchase of advertis-

117. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Z; GAO Study, supra note 6; see, e.g., GOLDWASSER,
ARNOLD & EICKEMEYER, supra note 113, at 5-126.
118. See, e.g., Kevin J. Lesinski, Notable Cases and Recent Settlements in Securities Litigation, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION: LEADING
LAWYERS ON WORKING WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES, COMPLYING WITH NEW
LEGISLATION, AND MONITORING COMPLIANCE 91, 98 (2011 ed.) (explaining that the
Ninth Circuit’s view was that deceptive conduct part of a “scheme to defraud” was
actionable under 10(b), while the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ view was that conduct
without a misstatement or omission was not actionable).
119. As in Central Bank, Justice Kennedy penned the majority opinion, with Justices Scalia and Thomas joining, and Justice Stevens wrote for the dissent, with Justices Souter and Ginsberg joining. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 150 (2008). Justices Roberts and Alito also joined the majority. Id. Justice Breyer did not participate. Id. Interestingly, while the SEC sided
with Investors (Petitioners/Plaintiffs), the Solicitor General sided with Supplier (Respondents/Defendants). See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 132.
120. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the case
reached the Court upon the lower court’s granting of Suppliers’ motion to dismiss, the
facts alleged by Investors are assumed to be true. See id. at 153 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 153-54 (majority opinion).
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ing from Charter.122 Because Charter would capitalize the purchase of the
set-top boxes and record the advertising sales as revenue in violation of generally accepted accounting principles, Charter could deceive its auditor into
approving false financial statements demonstrating that it had met its projected cash flow and revenue numbers.123
Suppliers, who played no part in the preparation or distribution of Charter’s financial statements, recorded the above-described transactions as a
“wash, under generally accepted accounting principles.”124 Investors alleged
that Suppliers “knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter’s intention to
use the transactions to inflate its revenues and knew the resulting financial
statements issued by Charter would be relied upon by research analysts and
investors.”125 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
ruling granting Suppliers’ motion to dismiss its decision.126

2. The Decision
The majority prefaced its opinion by noting that the circuit courts were
in disagreement regarding whether a plaintiff could recover under §10(b)
against a party that did not make a public misrepresentation or violate a duty
to disclose but did participate in a prohibited scheme under §10(b).127 The
Court determined that Suppliers’ “course of conduct included both oral and
written statements, such as the backdated contracts agreed to by Charter and
respondents” and conceded that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive.” 128 However, the Court found that the lack of reliance was fatal to Investors’ claim,

122. Id. at 154. Suppliers drafted false documents in furtherance of the fraudulent
scheme. Id. Specifically, Scientific-Atlanta sent documents to Charter that falsely
stated that, in light of increased production costs, the price of the set-top boxes would
be increased by twenty dollars per box. Id. Motorola, by written contract, obligated
Charter to purchase a defined number of set-top boxes, with liquidated damages of
twenty dollars due for each box that it did not take, knowing that Charter would pay
the liquidated damages. Id. Further, Suppliers signed contracts with Charter agreeing
to purchase advertising at an inflated rate and backdated the set-top box contracts so
that the agreements would not appear to be connected. Id. at 154-55. These arrangements allowed Charter to inflate its reported revenue and operating cash flow numbers by approximately $17 million. Id. at 155. Such inflated numbers were included
in financial statements filed with the SEC and were publicly reported. Id.
123. Id. at 154.
124. Id. at 155.
125. Id.
126. Id.; see In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir.
2006), aff’d sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S.
148 (2008).
127. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 158.
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noting that reliance provided the “requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.” 129
Investors argued that, under the theory of “scheme liability,” Suppliers
were liable even without having made a public statement.130 Rejecting this
notion, the majority opined:
In effect [P]etitioner contends that in an efficient market investors
rely not only upon the public statements relating to a security but
also upon the transactions those statements reflect. Were this concept of reliance to be adopted, the implied cause of action would
reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does
business; and there is no authority for this rule….131
The Court concluded that Suppliers’ deceptive acts were “too remote to
satisfy the element of reliance,” noting that such acts were not publicly disclosed.132 “It was Charter, not [Suppliers], that misled its auditor and filed
fraudulent financial statements; nothing [Suppliers] did made it necessary or
inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.”133 Because Investors could not demonstrate reliance on Suppliers’ alleged acts, except through
129. Id. at 159 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority explained that there was a rebuttable
presumption of reliance in two instances: (1) where there is an omission of a material
fact by a person who has a duty to disclose, and (2) where there are public statements
and the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is applicable. Id. The majority found neither of
these instances were applicable in the case at bar. Id. The dissent noted that, because
the Eighth Circuit’s decision was not based on a lack of reliance, the majority should
have remanded for a determination of whether reliance had been properly alleged. Id.
at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 159-60 (majority opinion).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The majority stated that it was irrelevant whether the Investors had pled
reliance under the standards of common law, as § 10(b) “does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law.” Id. at 162. However, Pritchard notes:
It would seem more accurate to say that the incorporation is selective: the Court borrows the
common law element of reliance, without
really explaining why, but then disregards it
when inconvenient. Kennedy’s rejection of
common law standards in Stoneridge suggests
that the Court is charting its own common law
course. The Court’s interventions, however,
are episodic; the Court takes an insufficient
number of securities cases to develop this
“common law” in any meaningful manner.
Pritchard, supra note 9, at 134-35.
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a remote and indirect chain of events, the majority held that the motion to
dismiss was properly granted.134
The dissent disagreed, asserting that the majority erroneously insisted on
“a kind of super-causation”135 to prove reliance. Specifically, the dissent
reasoned that the fraud-on-the-market presumption (which protects investors
who cannot demonstrate individual reliance) does not speak to how a corporation or individual causes the misleading information to reach the market.136
As such, the dissent concludes that the majority “has it backwards when it
first addresses the fraud-on-the-market presumption, rather than the causation
required.”137 Succinctly stated, “[t]he argument is not that the fraud-on-themarket presumption is enough standing alone, but that a correct view of causation coupled with the presumption would allow [P]etitioner to plead reliance.”138 Therefore, in the dissent’s view, it was foreseeable that Suppliers’
actions caused Investors to undertake the securities transactions at issue.139
The Court also declined to extend the private right of action under
§10(b) to “the realm of ordinary business operations[,]” which, it noted, is
primarily governed by state law:140 “Just as §10(b) is surely badly strained
when construed to provide a cause of action . . . to the world at large, it
should not be interpreted to provide a private cause of action against the entire marketplace in which the issuing company operates.”141 The dissent convincingly countered that “liability only attaches when the company doing
business with the issuing company has itself violated § 10(b).”142
134. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. Pritchard notes that the majority could have
more naturally reached its conclusion by relying on the “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” language in § 10(b), rather than the reliance analysis.
Pritchard, supra note 9, at 132-33, 138. One reason for not doing so is that this approach could have restricted the SEC, which does not need to prove reliance in the
matters it pursues. Id.
135. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 168 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 171 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 172.
140. Id. at 161 (majority opinion). Because Suppliers’ activities “took place in the
marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere,” and because
“Charter was free to do as it chose in preparing its books . . . and then issuing its financial statements[,]” Investors could not have relied on Suppliers’ alleged deceptive
actions in deciding whether to purchase or sell securities. Id. at 166-67.
141. Id. at 162 (citations omitted) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.5 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he §
10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries. . . . It is
appropriate for us to assume that when . . . [the PSLRA] was enacted, Congress accepted the § 10(b) private cause of action as then defined but chose to extend it no
further.” Id. at 165-66 (citing Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083,
1102 (1991)).
142. Id. at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Particularly relevant to Janus, the majority noted, as it did in Central
Bank, that in addition to the threat of criminal penalties and state actions,
secondary actors may face private suit:
All secondary actors, furthermore, are not necessarily immune
from private suit. The securities statutes provide an express private
right of action against accountants and underwriters in certain circumstances and the implied right of action in § 10(b) continues to
cover secondary actors who commit primary violations.”143
The Court concluded that its opinion was “consistent with the narrow
dimensions we must give to a right of action Congress did not authorize when
it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.”144
In a strongly-written dissent, Justice Stevens prefaced his opinion by
stating that the majority “seems to assume” that Suppliers could face aiding
and abetting liability under § 20(e), but that they escape private liability because “they are, at most, guilty of aiding and abetting a violation of § 10(b),
rather than an actual violation of the statute.”145 Justice Stevens labeled the
majority’s decision a “significant departure” from Central Bank.146
143. Id. at 166 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (§ 11 of the 1934 Act, see Ch. 404, § 11, 48 Stat. 881
(1934)); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 191 (1994)). The majority also noted that the SEC’s “enforcement power is
not toothless”, noting that since late 2002, the SEC, through enforcement actions, had
collected more than $10 billion in penalties and disgorgement, with much of that
money inuring to the benefit of aggrieved investors. Id. at 166.
144. Id. at 167.
145. Id. at 167-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 168.
What the Court fails to recognize is that this
case is critically different from Central Bank
because the bank in that case did not engage in
any deceptive act and, therefore, did not itself
violate § 10(b). . . .

. . . The facts of this case would parallel those
of Central Bank if [Suppliers] had, for example, merely delayed sending invoices for settop boxes to Charter. Conversely, the facts in
Central Bank would mirror those in the case
before us today if the bank had knowingly purchased real estate in wash transactions at
above-market prices in order to facilitate the
appraiser’s overvaluation of the security. Central Bank, thus, poses no obstacle to
[P]etitioner’s argument that it has alleged a
cause of action under § 10(b).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

25

File: KibbiePaginated.docx

Created on: 10/21/13 9:51 PM
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5 Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM

196

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

The dissent concluded with a detailed commentary on the importance
and long history of implied private actions under the 1934 Act.147 Noting that
“[t]he Court’s current view of implied causes of action is that they are merely
a ‘relic’ of our prior ‘heady days,’” Justice Stevens stated: “[t]hose ‘heady
days’ persisted for two hundred years.”148 Tracing the judicial development
of the common law during the first two centuries of U.S. history, Justice Stevens explained that “[a] basic principle animating our jurisprudence was enshrined in state constitution provisions guaranteeing, in substance, that ‘every
wrong shall have a remedy.’”149 He emphasized how federal courts widely
enforced private causes of action under the Acts until the Court’s decision in
Central Bank.150
During the late 1940’s, the 1950’s, the 1960’s and the early 1970’s
there was widespread, indeed almost general, recognition of implied causes of action for damages under many provisions of the …
[1934 Act], including not only the antifraud provisions, §§10 and
15(c)(1),… but many others. These included the provision,
§6(a)(1), requiring securities exchanges to enforce compliance
with the Act and any rule or regulation made thereunder,…and
provisions governing the solicitation of proxies…. Writing in
1961, Professor Loss remarked with respect to violations of the
antifraud provisions that with one exception ‘not a single judge has
expressed himself to the contrary.’ ….When damage actions for
violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 reached the Supreme Court, the
existence of an implied cause of action was not deemed worthy of
extended discussion.151

Id. at 169-70. Justice Stevens stated that he respectfully dissented “from the Court’s
continuing campaign to render the private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless.”
Id. at 175.
147. Id. at 175-79.
148. Id. at 175-76.
149. Id. at 176, 176 n.12 (noting that such a guarantee still appears in almost 75
percent of state constitutions). Federal courts adopted this principle with regard to
statutes with open questions of remedy until 1975, when the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), requiring the application of a
four-factor test to determine whether Congress envisioned a private right of action.
See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 177-79 (listing implied causes of action recognized by the
Court under various statutes). Thereafter, the Supreme Court clarified that an evaluation of Congressional intention as of a certain time “must take into account its contemporary legal context.” Id. at 178 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,
698-99 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Id. at 178-79.
151. Id. at 179 (quoting Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Friendly, J.)).
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Concluding his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens wrote that “Congress
enacted §10(b) with the understanding that federal courts respected the principle that every wrong would have a remedy,” and that the majority’s decision cuts back further the remedy that Congress intended.152

C. Janus
After Central Bank, the circuit courts were split regarding the method of
distinguishing actionable primary liability for secondary actors from conduct
for which no right of action existed.153 The “bright-line attribution rule”
required public attribution of a misstatement or omission to a defendant at the
time of the dissemination to establish primary liability; this rule was followed by the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.154 The “substantial
participation rule” required that a defendant’s involvement in a misstate152. Id. at 180.
153. See, e.g., Liam O’Brien & Alexander Broche, The Impact of the Janus Ruling

on Secondary Liability in 10b-5 Claims, 15 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC.
ELECTRONIC AGE 10 (2011), available at 15 No. 8 Wallstreetlawyer.com: Sec. Elec.
Age 10.
154. See, e.g., id. (citing In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987,
992 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 386-90 (5th Cir. 2007); Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, 256 F.3d
1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.
1998)). Arguing against the bright-line attribution rule, the Law Professors’ Janus
Amici Brief posited that “such a rule would automatically eliminate the possibility of
review for a vast universe of fraud. . . .” Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra
note 7, at *7.
Consider the numerous cases in which a corporate executive intentionally misleads a journalist or financial analyst, who in turn publishes
highly favorable reports without identifying
the executive as a source. Even in the absence
of direct attribution, the executive has nevertheless perpetrated a clear fraud on the market.
Courts have reasonably responded to such
cases by finding the executive liable, yet petitioners’ rule would overturn such decisions.
The sensible approach, set forth by this Court
in Stoneridge, is instead to inquire whether the
executive engaged in a deceptive scheme and,
if so, whether that deception was sufficiently
proximate to the statements upon which investors relied. A strict attribution rule would
senselessly abort the sound analysis of Stoneridge.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

27

File: KibbiePaginated.docx

Created on: 10/21/13 9:51 PM
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5 Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM

198

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

ment’s creation be sufficient enough to render attribution to such defendant
reasonable; this rule was adopted by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.155 Further, the Tenth Circuit’s rule imposed liability on actors who knew or should
have known that their statements would reach potential investors who would
rely on them.156 The SEC’s view, since 1998, has been that primary liability
under Rule 10b-5 should be imposed where “a person, acting alone or with
others, creates a misrepresentation – assuming, of course, that he or she acts
with the requisite scienter.”157 According to the SEC, one “creates” a statement when “the statement is written or spoken by him, or if he provides the
false or misleading information that another person then puts into the statement, or if he allows the statement to be attributed to him.”158 Three years
155. See, e.g., O’Brien & Broche, supra note 153 (citing In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Secs. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566
F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)). The Fourth Circuit Janus court reasoned:
We conclude . . . that given the publicly disclosed responsibilities of [Adviser] interested
investors would infer that [Adviser] played a
role in preparing or approving the content of
the Janus fund prospectuses, particularly the
content pertaining to the funds’ policies affecting the purchase or sale of shares. It was publicly known that [Adviser] furnished advice
and recommendations concerning the Janus
funds’ investment decisions and even made
NAV determinations, which in part enabled
market timing. In light of the publicly available material, interested investors would have
inferred that if [Adviser] had not itself written
the policies in the Janus fund prospectuses regarding market timing, it must at least have
approved these statements. This circumstance
is sufficient to support the adequacy of plaintiff’s pleading of fraud-on-the-market reliance
as to [Adviser].
In re Mut. Funds Inv. Secs. Litig., 566 F.3d at 127 (distinguishing Stoneridge in which
the fraud-on-the-market presumption was not applicable because the transactions at
issue were not publicly disclosed). Note that some commentators believe that the
Fourth Circuit’s attribution rule was something other than “substantial participation”
because of its requirement that a plaintiff must prove that investors would attribute the
misstatements to the defendant, a determination made by the court on a case-by-case
basis. See, e.g., Lesinski, supra note 118, at 100.
156. See, e.g., Lesinski, supra note 118, at 100 (citing Anixter v. Home-Stake
Prods. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996)).
157. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *13.
158. Id. (citing Brief of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Amicus Curiae, in Support of
the Position of Plaintiffs-Appellants on the Issue Addressed and in Support of Neither
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after Stoneridge, in June 2011, in the midst of this confusion, the Roberts
Court released its highly controversial 5-4 Janus decision.159

1. Janus Background
The relationship of the Janus entities at issue is typical of most mutual
fund/adviser structures.160 Janus Capital Group, Inc. (“Adviser Parent”), a
publicly-traded company, created the “Janus family” of mutual funds, Janus
Investment Fund (“Fund”), organized as a Massachusetts business trust.161
Fund is entirely owned by mutual fund investors, and it has no assets except
those owned by such investors.162 Fund retained Janus Capital Management
LLC (“Adviser”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Adviser Parent, to serve as
its investment adviser and administrator;163 in such capacity, Adviser provides “the management and administrative services necessary for the operation” of Fund.164 Adviser “manages the purchase, sale, redemption and distribution” of Fund’s investments; “prepares, modifies and implements . . .
[Fund’s] long-term strategies[;]” and carries out Fund’s daily activities.165
Notably, all of the officers of Fund were also officers of Adviser.166 Further,
one of Fund’s trustees was associated with Adviser.167 As noted by the dissent, Adviser’s employees both drafted and reviewed Fund’s prospectuses,
including the market timing language at issue in Janus.168 Adviser also distributed the prospectuses through Adviser Parent’s website.169 Critically, as
noted by the dissent, Adviser “may well have kept the trustees in the dark
about the true ‘market timing’ facts” at issue in this case.170

Affirmance Nor Reversal at 7, Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603
F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-16190cv), 2009 WL7768584)).
159. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296. Notably, the same Justices who comprised the Stoneridge majority also made up the Janus majority: Justice Thomas authored this time,
with Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Alito joining. Id. at 2299. Justice Breyer
wrote for the dissent and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. Id.
160. See infra Part IV.
161. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2299 (majority opinion).
167. Id. As noted by the Court, “[t]his is more independence than is required
[under the 1940 Act.]” Id. Pursuant to the 1940 Act, up to sixty percent of a mutual
fund’s board may be composed of “interested persons”, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(a)(19) (2006). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a).
168. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id.; see infra notes 225, 230-31 and accompanying text.
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The prospectuses issued to Fund investors stated that the funds at issue
“were not suitable for market timing”171 and could “be read to suggest that
Adviser would implement policies to curb the practice.”172 However, in late

171. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 (majority opinion). For example, the Court cited
the February 25, 2002 prospectus for the Janus Mercury Fund, which “stated that the
fund was ‘not intended for market timing or excessive trading’ and represented that it
‘may reject any purchase request . . . if it believes that any combination of trading
activity is attributable to market timing or is otherwise excessive or potentially disruptive to the Fund.’” Id.; see also In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 116-17
(4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (detailing other market timing
statements from Fund prospectuses). “Clearly, . . . [such statements were] false, because at the same time . . . [they were] written, Janus’s managers were cutting market
timing deals with large investors.” Nathan Hale, Fund Investors Take a Hit from the
Supreme Court, CBS NEWS (June 20, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301505123_162-37640654/fund-investors-take-a-hit-from-the-supreme-court.
172. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. Market timing is a practice that exploits the
method in which mutual funds value their shares. Id. at 2300 n.1. Funds typically
calculate the net asset value (“NAV”) of their shares at the close of the major markets
in the United States, and investors buy or sell at a price based on the NAV calculation
following their order. Id. Timing delays in valuation information can result in an
NAV calculation that does not accurately reflect the true value of the fund. Id. For
example, if a fund values its foreign securities as of the close of the applicable foreign
market and if events post-closing increased the value of such securities, such increased value would not be reflected in the NAV calculation. Id. As such, a market
timer could buy mutual fund shares at the artificially low price and sell the following
day when the NAV calculation incorporated the increased valuation. Id. (citing Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68
Fed. Reg. 70,402-01 (Dec. 17, 2003)); see also, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566
F.3d at 116 (discussing “time zone arbitrage” in connection with market timing transactions). Market timing harms other investors in the fund “by diluting the value of
shares, increasing transaction costs, reducing investment opportunities for the fund,
and producing negative tax consequences.” In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at
116. As articulately explained in the Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief:
To choreograph a market-timing ruse, an investment manager needs – and arrogates for itself – control over all aspects of mutual fund
operations: the manager advertises its funds to
new purchasers through an affiliated distributor; the manager determines the policies that
govern those funds and publicizes them in
fund prospectuses that it writes; the manager
monitors trading activity in the shares of its
funds through an affiliated transfer agent or
administrator; and the manager negotiates special arrangements for favored clients such as
hedge funds who engage in market timing.
....
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2003, the Attorney General of the State of New York accused Adviser Parent
and Adviser of entering into secret arrangements allowing market timing, to
the detriment of investors who did not engage in such practices, in several
funds in which Adviser served as investment adviser.173 Fund investors subsequently withdrew “significant amounts” of money from Fund mutual
funds.174 Adviser Parent and Adviser settled in 2004, agreeing to reduce their
fees by $125 million, pay $50 million in civil penalties, and disgorge $50
million to mutual fund investors.175

. . . In sum, to perpetrate a market-timing
fraud, an investment manager must coordinate
all major aspects of a mutual fund. The fund
itself is little more than the manager’s weapon
of choice.
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *11-13 (citing TAMAR FRANKEL
& ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS §§ 12, 21-22, 27,
32 (2d ed. 2001)).
173. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. Specifically, Adviser Parent allegedly knowingly
allowed ten hedge funds to engage in market timing activities, which allowed them
“guaranteed profits”, in return for the hedge funds’ agreements to invest heavily in
other Janus funds, which increased Adviser’s advisory fees and Adviser Parent’s
profits. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 171. Of course, such “guaranteed profits” to the
hedge funds came from the accounts of other mutual fund investors. See id.
174. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
175. Id. at 2300 n.2; In re Janus Capital Mgmt., LLC, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2277, Investment Company Act Release No. 26532, 83 SEC Docket
1766 (Aug. 18, 2004), 2004 WL 1845502, at *4 (finding that Adviser had willfully
violated (1) §§ 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, “in that,
while acting as an investment adviser, it employed devices, schemes, or artifices to
defraud clients or prospective clients, and engaged in transactions, practices, or
courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon clients
or prospective clients;” (2) § 34(b) of the 1940 Act, “in that it made an untrue statement of material fact in a registration statement, application, report, account, record,
or other document filed or transmitted pursuant to the Investment Company Act, or
omitted to state therein any fact necessary in order to prevent the statements made
therein, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, from being
materially misleading;” and (3) § 17(d) of the 1940 Act and Rule 17d-1 thereunder,
“in that, while acting as a principal, it participated in and effected transactions in
connection with joint arrangements in which the funds were participants without
filing an application with the Commission and obtaining a Commission order approving the transactions.”), amended on other grounds by In re Janus Capital Mgmt., LLC,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3065, Investment Company Act Release No.
29377, 2010 WL 3071930 (Aug. 5, 2010). In connection with the settlement, Adviser
agreed to “use its best efforts to cause the Janus funds to operate in accordance with
[certain enumerated] governance policies and practices[.]” Id. at *5. This fact alone
emphasizes the reality that, with respect to Fund, Adviser exerted a tremendous
amount of control and was no ordinary secondary actor. See, e.g., Hale, supra note
171.
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Fund’s decreased valuation as a result of the market timing scandal
caused Adviser Parent’s stock price to fall by approximately 25 percent.176
First Derivative Traders (“First Derivative”), representing a class of plaintiffs
who owned Adviser Parent stock, sued Adviser Parent and Adviser for violations of §10(b) and Rule10b-5, alleging that Adviser Parent and Adviser
“caused mutual fund prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and
made them available to the investing public, which created the misleading
impression that [Adviser Parent and Adviser] would implement measures to
curb market timing in the Janus [mutual funds].”177 First Derivative claimed
that plaintiffs relied “upon the integrity of the market price of [Adviser Parent] securities and market information relating to [Adviser Parent and Adviser].”178 First Derivative also asserted a “controlling person” claim against
Adviser Parent pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act.179
The District Court of Maryland granted Adviser Parent’s and Adviser’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.180 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the complaint adequately alleged that
the defendants, “by participating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, made the misleading statements contained in the documents.”181
The Fourth Circuit held that the element of reliance with respect to Adviser
was adequately pled, as “investors would infer that Adviser ‘played a role in
preparing or approving the content of the [Fund’s] prospectuses.’”182 However, because investors would not make such an inference with respect to

176. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. A “significant percentage of [Adviser Parent]’s
income” was comprised of Adviser’s management fees, which were based upon the
total value of the mutual funds. Id. Thus, when the value of the mutual funds
dropped, so did Adviser Parent’s value. Id.
177. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, First Derivative did not allege a § 20(a) control person claim against
Adviser. Id. at 2301.
178. Id. at 2301 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As noted by the dissent, the complaint set forth the elements of a typical
“‘fraud on the market’ claim.” Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2301 (majority opinion).
180. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d, 566
F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
181. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111,
121 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
182. Id. (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 127). It has been noted
that “the Fourth Circuit is not considered to be one of the more liberal circuits when
interpreting the scope of the federal securities laws.” ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D.
LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD § 7:306.50 (2d ed. 2011).
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Adviser Parent, the Fourth Circuit held that Adviser Parent could only face
control person liability under §20(a) of the 1934 Act.183
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether
Adviser could be held liable in a private Rule 10b-5 action for materially
misleading statements included in Fund’s prospectuses.184 In a thinlyreasoned and tediously-written opinion, the Court held that it could not.185

2. The Decision
With no analysis whatsoever regarding §10(b),186 the Roberts Court
sophomorically based its opinion on selected definitions of the word “make”
from the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary and the 1934 edition
of the Webster’s New International Dictionary:
One “makes” a statement by stating it. When “make” is paired
with a noun expressing the action of a verb, the resulting phrase is
“approximately equivalent in sense” to that verb. 6 Oxford English
Dictionary 66 (def. 59) (1933) (hereinafter OED); accord, Webster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (def. 43) (2d ed. 1934)
(“Make” followed by a noun with the indefinite article is often
nearly equivalent to the verb intransitive corresponding to that
noun”). For instance, “to make a proclamation” is the approximate
equivalent of “to proclaim,” and “to make a promise” approximates “to promise.” See 6 OED 66 (def. 59). The phrase at issue
in Rule 10b-5, “[t]o make any … statement,” is thus the approximate equivalent of “to state.”

183. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at

128-30).
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. The Court’s failure to begin its analysis with a textual interpretation of §

10(b) and an analysis of how the 73d Congress would have dealt with the matter, as
required pursuant to Central Bank, seems to underscore the policy-driven nature of its
decision. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164 (1994); see also, e.g., James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar: The
Supreme Court Turns Away Another Securities Law Plaintiff, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 463,
465-66 (2012) (noting that Janus “stands the traditional method of statutory analysis –
by which one starts with the language of the statute and then proceeds to analyze, in
descending order, the legislative history, the statutory scheme, and lastly, policy considerations – on its head.”); Pritchard, supra note 9, at 136-37. Further, the Court’s
decision to disregard the views of the SEC, which promulgated Rule 10b-5 and is
charged with its enforcement, is puzzling, to say the least. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text; infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person
or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it. Without control,
a person or entity can merely suggest what to say, not “make” a
statement in its own right. One who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker. And in the ordinary
case, attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding
circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by –
and only by—the party to whom it is attributed. This rule might
best be exemplified by the relationship between a writer and a
speaker. Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is
entirely within the control of the person who delivers it.187 And it
is the speaker who takes credit – or blame – for what is ultimately
said.188

187. In its Amicus Brief, the SEC articulately demonstrated that the speechwriter/speaker analogy was flawed:
Whereas the phrase “make a speech” generally
refers to oral delivery by a single person at a
discrete point in time, the Funds’ prospectuses
were written documents disseminated through
a variety of methods. The prospectuses,
moreover, were issued in the names of artificial persons (the Janus Funds) who by definition can act only through (and at the direction
of) others. In the context of such a written
document, those who actually drafted the
statements contained in the document can
naturally be described as their “maker.”
U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *15.
188. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. This speechwriter/speaker analogy has spurred
many counter-analogies. See, e.g., Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7,
at *7 (principal/microphone and speakers); Redwood, supra note 186, at 496 (general
contractor/subcontractor); Hale, supra note 171 (puppeteer/puppet); Brent Kendall,
Janus Found Not Liable for Funds’ Prospectuses, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303848104576383453742250090.ht
ml (quoting Professor William Birdthistle of Chicago-Kent College of Law) (manipulator/marionette); see also New York Times Editorial, supra note 11 (stating that Adviser Parent used “legal ventriloquism to speak through the business trust and Janus
funds”).
Given that the majority’s decision is premised upon a suspension of the realities of mutual fund law and practice, this Article suggests that the Oz analogy is appropriate. See supra note 14. The scene in L. Frank Baum’s 1899 story (which
formed the basis for the 1939 movie) in which Dorothy’s group discovers “a little, old
man, with a bald head and a wrinkled face” behind the screen, seems written for the
occasion:
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Rejecting the Government’s contention that “make” should be interpreted as “create[,]”189 the majority continued its abstruse analysis:
“But, I don’t understand,” said Dorothy, in
bewilderment. “How was it that you appeared
to me as a great Head?”
“That was one of my tricks,” answered Oz.
“Step this way, please, and I will tell you all
about it.”
He led the way to a small chamber in the rear
of the Throne Room, and they all followed
him. He pointed to the corner, in which lay the
Great Head, made out of many thicknesses of
paper, and with a carefully painted face.
“This I hung from the ceiling by a wire,” said
Oz; “I stood behind the screen and pulled a
thread, to make the eyes move and the mouth
open.”
“But how about the voice?” she enquired.
“Oh, I am a ventriloquist,” said the little man,
“I can throw the sound of my voice wherever I
wish, so that you thought it was coming out of
the Head.
L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 181-86 (100th Anniv. Ed., Harper
Collins 2000).
189. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at
*14-15). The SEC and DOJ asserted:
For purposes of the question presented here,
the most salient feature of the Commission’s
interpretation is the conclusion that one can
“make” a statement by “creat[ing]” or
“writ[ing]” it, even if the statement’s creator is
not expressly identified. That conclusion is
fully consistent with the ordinary meaning of
the term “make.” See, e.g., 1 Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary 1682 (6th ed. 2007) (def.
I.1.c, transitive verb: “Compose, write as the
author (a book, a poem, verses, etc.); draw up
(a legal document, esp. one’s will)”; def. I.2,
transitive verb: “Cause the material or physical
existence of; produce by action, bring about;
create or take part in the creation of; produce
by action, bring about; create or take part in
the creation of (a sound recording, film,
etc.)”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (2d ed. 1958) (def. III. 17: “To cause
to exist, appear, or occur”); see also SEC v.
Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (referring to “several common and
representative dictionary definitions of ‘make,’
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The Government contends that “make” should be defined as “create.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-15 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (2d ed. 1958) (defining
“make” as “[t]o cause to exist, appear, or occur”)). This definition,
although perhaps appropriate when “make” is directed at an object
unassociated with a verb (e.g., “to make a chair”), fails to capture
its meaning when directed at an object expressing the action of a
verb.190
The majority’s curt dismissal of the SEC’s interpretation of its own
rule191 is mystifying and is in contradiction to the deference given the SEC by
the New Deal Court.192
which include ‘create [or] cause’; ‘compose’;
and ‘cause (something) to exist’”) (citations
omitted).
U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *14.
190. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. The majority also, in a footnote, dispensed with
First Derivative’s assertion that “indirectly” in Rule 10b-5 broadens the definition of
“make”, stating, “[w]e think the phrase merely clarifies that as long as a statement is
made, it does not matter whether the statement was communicated directly or indirectly to the recipient.” Id. at 2305 n.11. The majority further muddied its muddy
waters: “In this case, we need not define precisely what it means to communicate a
‘made’ statement indirectly because none of the statements in the prospectuses were
attributed, explicitly or implicitly, to [Adviser]. . . . More may be required to find that
a person or entity made a statement indirectly, but attribution is necessary.” Id. The
dissent strongly noted that this attribution rule was unsupported by citation to any
relevant legal authority. Id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Redwood,
supra note 186, at 480 n.112 (noting the arguments of First Derivative and the United
States as amicus that, with respect to § 10(b), “‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ are adverbs
that cannot grammatically modify prepositional phrases”); id. at 484 (“[N]either the
actual language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 nor the grammatical structure of the
statute and rule supports the Court’s limitation of the word ‘indirectly’ to the method
of communication.”). As noted by the SEC, “[i]f an issuer can ‘indirectly make’ an
untrue statement by using an analyst as a conduit, other persons can likewise indirectly make an untrue statement through an issuer.” U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra
note 7, at *16.
191. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8 (majority opinion). As asserted by the SEC:
The Commission’s interpretation of the term
“make” in Rule 10b-5 – having been adopted
in the agency’s briefs and in a formal adjudication – is “controlling” as long as it is not
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
461 (1997) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); accord Federal Express Corp.
v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (deferring to the interpretation of an EEOC regula-
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In his dissent, Justice Breyer countered:
But where can the majority find legal support for the rule that it
enunciates? The English language does not impose upon the word
“make” boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative.
Every day, hosts of corporate officials make statements with content that more senior officials or the board of directors have “ultimate authority” to control. So do cabinet officials make statements
about matters that the Constitution places within the ultimate
authority of the President. So do thousands, perhaps millions, of
other employees make statements that, as to content, form, or timing, are subject to the control of another. Nothing in the English
language prevents one from saying that several different individuals, separately or together, “make” a statement that each has a hand
in producing.193

tion advanced in an amicus brief); cf. SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-820 (2002) (according Chevron deference to an SEC interpretation of the “text of § 10(b)” adopted in a
“formal adjudication”).
U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *13-14.
192. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Pritchard, supra
note 9, at 117.
193. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2306
(“[B]oth language and case law indicate that, depending upon the circumstances, a
management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or others,
separately or together, might ‘make’ statements contained in a firm’s prospectus –
even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility”) (emphasis
added). Some commentators have expressed complete bewilderment at the majority’s
selective use of the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY. See, e.g., Redwood, supra note
186, at 466 (“[E]ven if one focuses in solely on the Oxford English Dictionary, it is
evident that a multitude of definitions of the verb “to make” was available to the
Court. Many of these definitions would have supported the plaintiffs in their efforts
to hold [Adviser] liable as a ‘maker’ of the fund prospectus misstatements in question.”); id. at 495 (“Perhaps recognizing that its excursion into ‘definition 59,’ deadending as it did in the cul-de-sac of the transitive versus intransitive debate, did almost nothing to advance understanding of the term, and being perhaps too daunted to
tackle any of the other ninety-five definitions propounded by the . . . [OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY], the Court abruptly abandoned the definitional field entirely
and substituted instead a ‘test’ for what is meant by the verb ‘to make.’”). Other
commentators have noted that the Janus Court’s definition of “make” has created “an
unusual carve-out for securities-related speech” that is inconsistent with other treatments of actionable speech. Edward Pekarek & Genavieve Shingle, The Make Believe of Janus, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N SEC. LITIG. ARB. (Oct. 13, 2011, 5:20 PM),
http://nysbar.com/blogs/SecuritiesLitigation/2011/10/the_make_believe_of_janus.htm
l (discussing concepts of actionable speech under defamation law; the Lanham Act,
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In a logical leap, the Court opined that Central Bank’s ban on private
aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5 required its ruling adopting the
“ultimate authority” test.194 Drawing “a clean line” between those who are
primarily liable and those who are secondarily liable, the Court held that “the
maker is the person or entity with ultimate authority over a statement and
others are not.”195 Thus, according to the majority’s test, only those with
“ultimate authority” can be held primarily liable under Rule 10b-5 as the
“maker” of a statement.
The dissent, emphasizing Central Bank’s secondary liability subject
matter, countered that Central Bank “no more requires the majority’s rule
than free air travel for small children requires free air travel for adults.”196
Rather, the dissent viewed Central Bank as dealing with aiding and abetting
liability with respect to those who did “not engage in the proscribed activities
at all, but who gave a degree of aid” to those who did.197 Further, it concluded that Central Bank supports the proposition that, under the right circumstances, numerous parties involved in the development of a prospectus
might “make” materially false statements that would invoke primary liability.198 The dissent highlighted the majority’s cautionary language in Central
Bank that it did
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006); and the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. § 230, among other laws).
194. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 2302 n.6. The dissent responded, “Where is the legal support for the
majority’s ‘draw[ing] a clean line’ that so seriously conflicts with Central Bank?” Id.
at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent argued that the majority’s rule extended Central Bank’s holding into areas “explicitly placed outside that
holding.” Id. at 2308.
197. Id. at 2307 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. Id. at 2308. As articulately noted by one commentator:
Can it be said, for example, that a building has
but one “maker”? Although a sign on a construction site might identify the architect or the
general contractor, does that any the less make
unidentified subcontractors not also the “makers” of the building? Certainly a person injured by faulty plumbing or electrical wiring in
a building would expect that the subcontractor
who designed, manufactured, constructed, or
installed the defective plumbing or wiring
would be held at least partly responsible for
her injury, on the common understanding that
the subcontractor was one of the “makers” of
the building (assuming, of course, that the
cause of the injury could be traced to the work
of that subcontractor). And this would be so
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…“not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or
entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.”199
The majority and dissenting opinions also diverged in their interpretations of Stoneridge. Emphasizing Stoneridge’s holding that “nothing [the
defendants] did made it necessary or inevitable for [the company] to record
the transactions as it did[,]”200 the majority opined that, likewise, nothing that
Adviser did “made it necessary or inevitable” for Fund to include the market
timing misstatements in its prospectuses. The majority saw “no reason to
treat participating in the drafting of a false statement differently from engaging in deceptive transactions [as in Stoneridge], when each is merely an undisclosed act preceding the decision of an independent entity to make a public
statement.”201 As discussed below, this is a misunderstanding of the facts
alleged by First Derivative and the realities of mutual fund prospectus preparation.202
regardless of whether the architect or the general contractor might also be liable.
Redwood, supra note 186, at 496 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
199. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2308 (quoting Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191).
200. Id. at 2303 (majority opinion) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id. at 2304.
202. In fact, the following exchange during oral argument between Justice Ginsburg and counsel for Adviser and Adviser Parent elucidates this fact:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Perry, you –
you said that it was the fund’s lawyers who
drafted the prospectus, but, in fact, it was [Adviser]’s lawyers, the lawyers – they were inhouse lawyers for [Adviser]. And they served
– and they served the funds in doing this prospectus, but they were on the payroll of [Adviser], and they were [Adviser]’s legal department.
MR. PERRY: Your Honor, like all lawyers,
they wear multiple hats. I represent multiple
clients. These lawyers represent multiple clients.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought they were inhouse lawyers?
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The dissent countered that the Stoneridge Court “did not deny that the
equipment suppliers had made the false statements contained in the letters,
contracts, and conversations”, but rather ruled that there was not “‘the requisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm.’”203 Further, the dissent clarified that the Stoneridge decision was based on a lack of reliance on the false
statements made by the suppliers, and that the suppliers’ fraudulent conduct
“‘took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment
sphere.’”204 As such, the dissent’s bewilderment regarding the majority’s
assertion that Stoneridge supported its ruling205 was well-founded.
In response to the assertions by First Derivative and its amici that an investment adviser is generally understood to be the “maker” of statements by a
mutual fund,206 the majority opined in a terse, cavalier manner: “We decline
this invitation to disregard the corporate form.”207 The majority simply de-

MR. PERRY: They are in-house lawyers at
[Adviser], but they also represent the funds,
and the SEC has specifically recognized in the
context of investment companies that where an
adviser counsel is representing the funds, his
client or her client, for those purposes, is the
funds. And here, these lawyers are very careful to separate who their – their clients are for
various purposes.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (No. 09-525) (emphasis
added); see also Redwood, supra note 186, at 498-99. In response to an interrogatory, Adviser also admitted that its in-house counsel drafted the prospectuses. See
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *20.
203. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Stoneridge, 552
U.S. at 158-59).
204. Id. (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166).
205. Id.
206. First Derivative argued that as an actor delivers lines written by a playwright,
so does a mutual fund via a prospectus deliver lines “made” by an investment adviser.
Id. at 2304 (majority opinion).
207. Id. Contrary to the majority’s holding regarding corporate separateness, as
explained in the Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, “the record amply demonstrates
that petitioners effectively merged the existence of the funds into their own: regarding
control of ‘business affairs,’ . . . officers . . . (all 17 officers of the funds were [Adviser’s] Vice Presidents), office space (provided by [Adviser]), . . . business address
(shared by the funds, [Adviser], and [Adviser Parent]), . . . and signature . . . (the
prospectuses were simply signed by ‘Janus.’” Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief,
supra note 7, at *19. Several commentators have noted that the Court “ignored the
practical operational control held by [Adviser] and seems to confusingly merge concepts of control with those involved in establishing an action for disregard of a corporate entity or ‘piercing the corporate veil.’” Farris, supra note 48, at n.7; see also,
e.g., Redwood, supra note 181, at 467, 501-11 (discussing the inapplicability of separate entity protection in the case of fraud).
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clined to participate in a more mature analysis of the complex issues presented, stating, “Any reapportionment of liability in the securities industry in
light of the close relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds
is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts.”208
In contrast, the dissent viewed other cases as supporting the consideration of the close relationship between advisors and mutual funds. Rejecting
the majority’s “ultimate authority” test, the dissent listed a long line of cases
holding that, under certain circumstances, corporate officials and others can
be liable under Rule 10b-5 for having made a materially false statement that
appears in a document or is made by a third person who is not legally controlled by such officials.209 The dissent also cited a string of cases holding
that corporate officials may be liable for making false statements where they
use innocent parties as conduits to the public (even where such statements are
not attributed to such corporate officials).210 The dissent concluded:

It should be noted that, with respect to private funds such as hedge funds and
private equity funds, both U.S. and non-U.S. advisers may be more vulnerable to
liability for prospectus misstatements, as the adviser or its principals usually serve as
the managing member or general partner of the fund, and non-U.S. funds may not
have an independent board. Farris, supra, note 48.
208. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
209. Id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (noting that a “lawyer, accountant, or bank, who . . . makes a material misstatement (or omission)” may
be primarily liable under Rule 10b-5 if all elements are met); Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n. 22 (1983) (explaining that corporate officers, lawyers and accountants who play a role in the preparation of a registration statement
may be held primarily liable even though “they are not named as having prepared or
certified” such registration statement); SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th
Cir. 2008) (holding that an outside consultant could be primarily liable for making
false statements where fraudulent annual and quarterly statements that were thereafter
reviewed and certified by the firm’s counsel, officers and auditor); McConville v.
SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a chief financial officer could be
primarily liable for making misstatements that appeared in a Form 10-K prepared by
her but not signed or filed by her); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215,
1225-27 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that an accountant could be primarily liable for
making false statements where fraudulent opinions and certification letters issued by
him were reproduced in prospectuses and other reports for which he did not have
ultimate authority)).
210. Id. (citing In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F. 3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that one may be liable for using an analyst as a conduit to communicate false
statements); In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 38 (1st Cir. 2002) (refusing to
adopt a test requiring legal control over a third party making a statement, as such a
test would give “company officials too much leeway to commit fraud on the market
by using analysts as their mouthpieces”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314-15
(2nd Cir. 2000); Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997); Freeland v.
Iridium World Commc’ns., Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 75-76 (D. D.C. 2008)).
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In sum, I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule 10b-5, its language,
its history, or in precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting
the securities laws, intended a loophole of the kind that the majority’s rule may well create.
….

. . . The relationship between . . . [Adviser] and . . . [Fund] could
hardly have been closer. …[Adviser’s] involvement in preparing
and writing the relevant statements could hardly have been greater.
And there is a serious suggestion that the board itself knew little or
nothing about the falsity of what was said. . . . Unless we adopt a
formal rule (as the majority here has done) that would arbitrarily
exclude from the scope of the word “make” those who manage a
firm – even when those managers perpetrate a fraud through an
unknowing intermediary – the management company at issue here
falls within that scope. We should hold the allegations in the complaint in this respect legally sufficient.211
Finally, the majority considered First Derivative’s arguments in light of
§20(a) of the 1934 Act. It viewed the theory of liability proposed by First
Derivative as resembling but “broader in application than” control person
liability under §20(a) of the 1934 Act,212 which, as discussed above, establishes liability for persons that directly or indirectly control violators of the
securities laws.213 The majority refused to expand on the liability expressly
created by Congress in §20. The dissent disagreed, noting that the “possibility of an express remedy under the securities laws does not preclude a claim
under § 10(b).”214 Critically, the dissent emphasized that, if an actor exploited an innocent intermediary, §20(a), which requires primary liability by
the controlled party, would not apply.215 Further, the dissent emphasized that
it was quite possible that Fund’s board of trustees knew nothing about the
misstatements in the prospectuses, in which case, § 20(a) would be inapplicable:216

Id.
Id. at 2304 (majority opinion); see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 388).
215. Id. Janus has opened the door for a flood of litigation regarding the parameters of “control person” liability under § 20. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 16.
216. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing In re Lammert, Release No. 348, 28, 93 SEC Docket 5676, 5700 (ALJ Apr. 28, 2008) (Adviser knew of
market timing in Fund no later than 2002, but “[t]his knowledge was never shared
with the Board”)).
211.
212.
213.
214.
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The possibility of guilty management and innocent board is the
13th stroke of the new rule’s clock. What is to happen when guilty
management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing materially false statements and fool both board and public into believing
they are true? Apparently under the majority’s rule, in such circumstances no one could be found to have “ma[d]e” a materially
false statement – even though under the common law the managers
would likely have been guilty or liable (in analogous circumstances) for doing so as principals (and not as aiders and abettors).217
In such circumstances, under the majority’s rule, the dissent cautioned
that even the SEC might be prohibited from asserting primary liability or
aiding and abetting liability.218 Paving the way for the next prominent case in
securities fraud law, the Court reserved the issue of whether Congress had
created liability for entities acting through innocent intermediaries in §
20(b).219
Although the Janus Court intended to create a workable, bright line test
regarding Rule 10b-5 liability, the decision has confounded scholars, practitioners and judges since it was penned. Part IV explores why the decision is
particularly impractical in the mutual fund context, and Part V summarizes
the resulting confusion in the lower courts.
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Id. As the majority did not specifically address this point, it is impossible to

tell if this was an oversight by the majority or an anticipated effect of the ruling. See
Juris, supra note 60 (suggesting that the decision’s effect on the SEC was most likely
an unintended and unanticipated result from a poorly worded opinion). This is in
contrast to the Court’s approach in Stoneridge, which was premised on a reliance
analysis and would therefore not be applicable to the SEC. See supra note 129. It
should be noted that the SEC may also, of course, pursue violators under other applicable laws, including pertinent sections of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the Advisers
Act, 1940 Act, and the Trust Indenture Act. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 138; see
also, e.g., supra note 175.
219. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10 (majority opinion). In response, the dissent
stated that, if § 20(b) provided a possible basis for liability, the majority should have
remanded for possible amendment of the complaint. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that “[t]here is a dearth of authority construing [§]
20(b)” because that section “has been thought largely superfluous in 10b-5 cases.” Id.
(quoting 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES
LAW § 11-8 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, First Derivative
reasonably believed that it had referred to the proper law, and “is faultless for failing
to mention § 20(b) as well.” Id.
Section 20(b) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do
under the provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by
means of any other person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006) (emphasis added).
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IV. THE PRACTICAL REALITIES AND DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE MUTUAL FUND/ ADVISER RELATIONSHIP
As noted above, the Janus decision precipitated a barrage of criticism
from scholars and practitioners.220 A New York Times Editorial stated:
Justice Thomas’s opinion is short and, from the mutual fund industry’s perspective, very sweet: [Adviser Parent and Adviser] were
heavily involved in preparing the prospectuses, but they didn’t
“make” the statements so they can’t be held liable. Only the business trust set up to hold the funds can be held liable, though it has
no assets of its own to compensate plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Which
means that there is no one to sue for the misleading prospectuses.

220. See, e.g., Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *2-3 (predicting that a victory by Adviser Parent and Adviser would “furnish a blueprint for widespread impunity from securities violations” and that “[a]ny corporation that publicly
claims to police the quality of its products while surreptitiously soliciting douceurs to
compromise that quality – as a investment manager does in a market-timing fraud –
would receive a tutorial on how to evade legal liability.”); Redwood, supra note 181,
at 466 (“In this author’s view, the Court’s holding is based on raw policy and little
else.”); O’Brien & Broche, supra note 153 (noting that commentators have critiqued
Janus as giving corporations “a license to lie” and as providing “a roadmap for
fraud”); Hale, supra note 171 (“[T]he Supreme Court struck a blow against the rights
of mutual fund investors, and in the process might have opened a Pandora’s box,
providing corporate America a road map that will allow them to avoid liability from
investor suits.”); New York Times Editorial, supra note 11 (noting that Justice Thomas’ Janus opinion “has made it much harder for private lawsuits to succeed against
mutual fund malefactors, even when they have admitted to lying and cheating”);
Gordon, supra note 16 (“Janus Capital Group does real damage. . . . At a time when
an increasingly large share of investment activity occurs through large pools of capital, the decision exacerbates the problem of ‘agency capitalism’ – the tendency of the
managing agents to pursue their own objectives at the expense of the ultimate beneficiaries. Why strain to find ways to insulate wrong-doers from accountability systems?”); Pekarek & Shingle, supra note 193 (“It appears the Janus Court may have
ushered in an era that may only make the capital markets increasingly risky for the
investing public, and stock market charlatans can almost be heard saying, ‘go ahead . .
. make my day.’”); Walter, supra note 35 (“Janus represents [a decision] . . . that is
shockingly out of line with the realities of the marketplace”).
On the other hand, others praised the “much-needed certainty” provided by
the decision’s bright-line test. Kendall, supra note 188. Commentators have noted
that shareholders of Fund could have most likely prevailed in a suit against Fund
under §§ 11, 12 and 15 of the 1933 Act and under Rule 10b-5, assuming proof of
damages. See, e.g., Farris, supra note 48. Although Adviser Parent shareholders
were without remedy in Janus, it has been posted that perhaps they could have been
successful in a suit against Adviser Parent based on omissions of material fact in
Adviser Parent public filings. See, e.g., id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/5

44

File: KibbiePaginated.docx

2013]

on: 10/21/13 9:51 PM
Kibbie: Kibbie:Created
Currently
Mandated Myopia

Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM

RULE 10b-5

215

There is no doubt that [Adviser Parent] is responsible. It used legal
ventriloquism to speak through the business trust and Janus funds.
[Adviser] does everything for the funds, which have no employees.
As Justice Stephen Breyer writes in dissent, “The relationship between [Adviser] and the Fund could hardly have been closer.”221
As set forth below, two fundamental untruths provide the pillars for Justice Thomas’ Janus decision: first, investment managers of mutual funds “are
simply the minions of those funds,” and second, “the lifeless funds created
and controlled by managers enjoy meaningful independent existence[.]”222 In
short, Janus is premised on the notion
that investment managers are merely subaltern “service providers”
orbiting funds at a great distance, tethered only by the flimsiest
thread of contract. Very much to the contrary, investment managers are prime movers who reign from the center of the mutual fund
universe. In the beginning, managers create, incubate, and hold
their funds as wholly owned subsidiaries. During this period of infancy, when the manager owns every share and every dollar in a
fund, the manager and fund execute a contract . . . whose . . . signatories are each controlled by the manager.223
As noted above, in light of the numerous front page stories of mutual
fund adviser misconduct over the last decade, including scandals involving
market timing, late trading, valuation misconduct and soft-dollar practices, 224
Janus’ absolution of advisers under Rule 10b-5(b) is a wrong that should be
legislatively remedied.

A.

Background Regarding the Mutual Fund/ Adviser Relationship

The mutual fund industry has grown exponentially since the enactment
of the 1940 Act.225 Total net mutual fund assets have grown from $0.45 billion in 1940 to $13.05 trillion in 2012.226 Further, the number of funds during
that time frame has grown from 68 to 7596,227 and the number of shareholder

221. New York Times Editorial, supra note 11 (quoting Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2313
(Breyer, J. dissenting)).
222. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *2.
223. Id. at *4-5 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at *23-24 (citing Josh Friedman, FleetBoston, BofA to Pay $675 Million,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004).
225. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1425 (2010).
226. INV. CO. INSTIT., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 142 (53d ed.
2013), http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.
227. Id.
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accounts has grown from 296,000 to 264,131,000.228 Investors generally
expect mutual funds to be relatively safe, well-regulated investments; over 44
percent of households in the United States own shares of mutual funds.229
Further, ninety-three percent of mutual fund investors are saving for retirement.230 Given these numbers, Justice Thomas’ Janus opinion creates the
potential for real harm.
The 1940 Act was enacted because of Congress’ “concern with the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies”231 and its
realization “that the relationship between a fund and its investment adviser
was fraught with potential conflicts of interest[.]”232
Before the enactment of the 1940 Act, there were widespread abuses by
investment companies and their sponsors, resulting in disastrous consequences to investors.233 According to SEC estimates, investors lost forty
percent of their investment company investments from 1929 to 1936, and
numerous funds failed.234 As a result, Congress commissioned a comprehensive study of the investment company industry in 1935, referred to as the
“Investment Trust Study,” which confirmed alarming abuses endemic in the
industry.235 Investors, who were generally unsophisticated, were frequently
mislead and “often did not understand their rights, the sales charges they were
obligated to pay, or how the investment company’s manager was managing
the company’s assets.”236 In short, “investment companies were being organized and operated to benefit the interests of their affiliates rather than the
interests of their shareholders.”237 Funds were structured so that “unscrupu-

228. Id.
229. See, e.g., id. at 90; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Seeks Public

Comment on Use of Derivatives by Mutual Funds and Other Investment Companies
(Aug. 31, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Fact Sheet], available at http://www.sec.gov/news
/press/2011/2011-175.htm; see also COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SECS., ABA
SECTION OF BUS. L., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INVESTMENT COMPANY USE OF
DERIVATIVES AND LEVERAGE 3 (2010).
230. 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 226, at 91.
231. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (quoting Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Id. (quoting Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 536-38) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
233. See, e.g., Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks at the American Law Institute/American Bar Association Investment Company Regulation and Compliance Conference: The Exciting World of Investment
Company Regulation (June 14, 2001) [hereinafter Roye Speech], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch500.htm.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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lous” sponsors remained in control, and conflicts of interest were rampant.238
The investment company industry was so corrupt that some suggested that it
was a “parasite upon the stream of industrial earnings, levying a toll upon the
yield of blue chip companies, resulting in unnecessary administrative costs
and taxes that were not economically justified.”239
In light of these problems, Congress, the SEC and the industry worked
diligently together to come up with the 1940 Act, which was “truly a negotiated statute.”240 The 1940 Act is an extremely complicated, creative statute
that borrowed concepts from the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the banking laws,
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Chandler Act (which
regulated bankruptcies), and even the Civil Aeronautics Act; however, the
1940 Act contains many wholly original provisions unique to the investment
company industry.241 It is unfortunate that its doctrinal underpinnings and
practical realities were disregarded by the Janus Court.

B.

Mutual Fund Structure and Adviser Control

It is well accepted, even by the Supreme Court, that mutual funds are
significantly different than typical operating companies.242 The “extraordinary degree of control” exerted by investment managers over their funds has
been recognized by each of the three branches of the United States government.243 In its unanimous 2010 opinion, Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.,244
238. Id. Specifically, sponsors often viewed the funds’ assets as their own
“source of private capital,” and embezzlements were common. Id. Further, improper
transaction between the funds and affiliates of the sponsors were often detrimental to
investors. Id. For example, underwriters often dumped unmarketable securities into
their affiliated funds. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. It should be noted that neither the 1940 Act nor the Investment Adviser’s
Act of 1940 contain an express private right of action for fraudulent activity, and
although some courts have implied private rights under the 1940 Act, “the strong
trend is against recognizing implied private rights under the federal securities laws.”
Clifford J. Alexander & Arthur C. Delibert, Private Rights of Action, in MONEY
MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE ¶ 1070 (2010). Further, “although each of the major
federal securities statutes contains a provision providing that contracts made in violation of the statute are void . . . . [t]he Supreme Court has held that such provisions
provide an implied private right of action only for rescission of the contract.” Id.
(citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)).
242. See, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *18-19 (citing Jones v.
Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010)).
243. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *3. The SEC has also
noted that “the term investment adviser is to some extent a misnomer because [t]he
so-called adviser is no mere consultant. He is the fund’s manager. Hence the investment adviser almost always controls the fund.’” Id. at *9 (quoting In re Steadman
Sec. Corp., 46 S.E.C. 896, 920 n.81 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fur-
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the Supreme Court acknowledged the unique relationship between an adviser
and a mutual fund:
A separate entity called an investment adviser creates the mutual
fund, which may have no employees of its own. The adviser selects the fund’s directors, manages the fund’s investments, and
provides other services. Because of the relationship between a
mutual fund and its investment adviser, the fund often cannot, as a
practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore,
the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual
fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the
American economy.245
Investment advisers are “essentially responsible for writing the prospectus.”246 Although mutual fund boards sign off on the prospectus language,
they turn to the adviser to “vouch for the statements made therein.”247 The
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief articulately explained:
Were one to conclude that the manager does not make the statements, misleading or otherwise, in a fund prospectus, one would be
left to wonder who does. To answer that the fund makes such
statements would be to admit circuitously that the manager does
so, inasmuch as the fund has no employees and its only officers are
ther, “even the managers’ own trade association has reported the extensive degree to
which managers run their funds, prepare fund prospectuses, and incur consequent
liability.” Id. at *14 (citing Brief for the Investment Company Institute as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, Jones, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (No. 08-586), 2009 WL
2896317 (stating that “[m]utual fund advisers . . . prepare prospectuses, shareholder
reports and other disclosures for which they have liability under the securities laws”)).
244. Jones, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (defining the parameters of an investment adviser’s
fiduciary duty with respect to fees it charges a mutual fund). Justice Alito penned the
unanimous decision, and Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1421.
245. Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Hale, supra note 171 (detailing the “entrenched” relationship between a mutual fund and its management company, and
recalling only one instance in which a mutual fund board fired its management company, which was “hailed as a ‘watershed event for the fund industry’”).
246. Hale, supra note 171; see also, e.g., Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief,
supra note 7, at *19 (“The [Janus] complaint alleges, and industry practice supports
the contention, that the fund manager ‘wrote and represented [its] policy against market timers . . .”); Farris, supra note 48.
247. Hale, supra note 171 (“If the fund’s board cannot rely on the information
they are receiving from the management company, I wonder where the Court supposes they should turn?”); see also, e.g., Farris, supra note 48 (noting that “the prospectus and most significant SEC filings would generally be approved by the fund’s
board of directors”).
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employees of the manager, who pays their salaries. To answer that
the board of trustees makes such statements would be to misunderstand fundamentally the process by which hundreds of pages of
mandatory disclosure are created for each fund every year, a production from which trustees are almost entirely absent. In fact, the
detailed and extensive content of fund disclosure is furnished almost exclusively by the one entity who knows that information: the
investment manager actually operating the fund.248
In comparing a mutual fund to “a microphone and speakers: necessary
instrumentalities that insentiently broadcast the principal’s message,” the Law
Professors’ Janus Amici Brief stated:
The investment manager, of course, is always the principal, writing and broadcasting the communications of its funds. And courts
have long since ceased to find inanimate objects guilty for the
wrongdoings of those who wield them.249
The SEC articulately rebuffed the notion of the investment adviser as a
secondary actor in its Janus Amicus Brief:
Although [Adviser] [like the corporate officers who would more
typically manage a company’s operations] was subject to oversight
by the Funds’ trustees, [Adviser] is alleged to have performed the
“insider” functions that corporate officers and employees would
ordinarily perform, not the advisory role typically associated with
outside service providers. If [Adviser] created statements for the
Funds’ prospectuses that misled investors about how the Funds
combated market timing, it can be held liable for its own “direct[]
248. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *6-7 (emphasis added).
An interesting question arises as to the liability of individual directors:
The mutual funds’ directors signed the registration statements of the mutual funds on
whose boards they sit. Yet Janus suggests that
individual directors, alone, cannot be considered to have “made” the statements because
they alone do not have “authority over the content of the statement and whether and how to
communicate it”; only the board as a whole
does.
Jay G. Baris, Jordan Eth, & Mark David McPherson, U.S. Supreme Court Limits
Reach of Primary Liability in Securities Fraud Cases, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2011, at 2.
249. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra, note 7, at *7 (emphasis added)
(citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) for the
proposition that “[d]eodands did not become part of the common-law tradition of this
country”).
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or indirect[]” statements to the market. As courts have recognized
in the context of conduits and publicly unidentified corporate employees, such cases involve primary liability, not aiding-andabetting liability, because the defendant is being held liable for its
own conduct – not for merely assisting someone else.250
The Janus Court’s requirement that aggrieved fund investors must sue
the fund, which holds no assets other than those of such investors,251 rather
than a fraudulent adviser, is troublesome because such an adviser would be
highly motivated to hide its own deceit. For example, in Janus, the Adviser
“was the only entity which [sic] had a motivation to hide the market timing
investments . . . [as it] received additional management fees based on these
investments.”252 In sum, Janus does real harm: it allows a deceitful manager
to “coordinate all major aspects of a mutual fund”253 for fraudulent purposes,
while it reaps increased fees, hides its deceit and avoids Rule 10b-5 liability.
Such an outcome must be rectified.

C. The Mutual Fund Board
Practically speaking, in performing their oversight function, mutual fund
boards rely heavily on the investment adviser.254 A critical feature of the
1940 Act, as amended in 1970, is the requirement that no more than 60 percent of the directors of a fund are “interested persons”, meaning that they
have no affiliation with or interest in the investment adviser.255 Such “disinterested directors” are intended to serve as “independent watchdogs of the
relationship between a mutual fund and its adviser.”256 However, as noted in
the United States Janus Amicus Brief, the 1940 Act provisions providing for
disinterested directors “simply ensure that a fund’s board of directors can
‘supply an independent check on [the investment adviser’s] management.’
250. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *23 (emphasis added).
251. See Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *2; Farris, supra

note 48. Notably, with respect to securitizations, aggrieved holders of securities may
have no other recourse than to sue the special purpose vehicle that issued the securities. See id.
252. Farris, supra note 48.
253. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *13; see supra note 172
for a discussion of the amount of mutual fund control that a manager must exert in
order to perpetrate a market timing fraud.
254. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 171 (“And where does the board get the information they [sic] need in order to provide their [sic] oversight? Well, from the management company, of course.”).
255. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), 80a-10(a) (2006); see also, e.g., Jones v. Harris
Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422-23 (2010).
256. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979)).
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The board’s oversight role does not change the fact that the adviser continues
to provide the management.”257
The Supreme Court in Jones recognized that a mutual fund board’s
oversight role may be compromised in certain situations because of its heavy
dependence on the adviser; in such circumstances, greater scrutiny of board
actions is warranted.258 Specifically, the Jones Court noted that, with respect
to adviser compensation, although “a measure of deference to a board’s
judgment may be appropriate in some instances . . . the appropriate measure
of deference varies depending on the circumstances.”259
[W]here the board’s process was deficient or the adviser withheld
important information, the court must take a more rigorous look at
the outcome. When an investment adviser fails to disclose material
information to the board, greater scrutiny is justified because the
withheld information might have hampered the board’s ability to
function as ‘an independent check upon the management.’ But an
adviser’s compliance or noncompliance with its disclosure obligations is a factor that must be considered in calibrating the degree of
deference that is due a board’s decision to approve an adviser’s
fees. . . . ‘[P]otential conflicts [of interest] may justify some restraints upon the unfettered discretion of even disinterested mutual
fund directors, particularly in their transactions with the investment
adviser’….260
In this light, Justice Thomas’ reliance on the “corporate separateness” of
Adviser and Fund in the Janus opinion seems grossly misplaced. By disregarding the important practical realities and doctrinal foundations of mutual
fund law and practice highlighted above, Janus potentially disadvantages all
mutual fund investors. Using Central Bank’s ominous opener, “[t]hat bodes
ill for” the ninety-three percent of mutual fund investors who are counting on
their mutual fund investments for safe and comfortable retirements.261 .

257. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *18 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
258. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1429-30.
259. Id. at 1421.
260. Id. at 1430 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
261. 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 226, at 90-91.
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V. POST-JANUS CONFUSION
The Janus opinion has spawned many contradictory lower court decisions over a variety of issues created by Justice Thomas’ opinion.262 This Part
summarizes the confusing aftermath created by Janus.

A. Questions Regarding Janus’ Impact on Public Suits Under Rule
10b-5, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, and Other Laws
Historically, the SEC has typically charged corporate executives with
violations of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and §17(a) of the 1933 Act in enforcement actions.263 Section 17(a), which does not provide a private right of action,264 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities (including security-based swaps) or any security-based
swap agreement (as defined in section 78c(a)(78) [§ 3(a)(78)] of
[the Securities Exchange Act]) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.265

262. See, e.g., Jonathan K. Youngwood, Bruce D. Angiolillo & Jason B. Gumer,
Lower Courts Seek to Answer Janus’s Open Questions, 8 SECURITIES LITIGATION
REPORT 1 (2011).
263. See, e.g., ROBERT P. HOWARD, JR., LAW360, IN PURSUIT OF FINANCIAL
FRAUDSTERS (2011), http://www.mmlawus.com/Data/Files/Articles/InPursuitO fFinancialFraudsters.pdf. As referenced throughout this article, the SEC also pursues
violators under other applicable laws, including pertinent sections of the 1933 Act, the
1934 Act, the Advisers Act, 1940 Act, and the Trust Indenture Act.
264. See, e.g., Farris, supra note 48.
265. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) are
associated with “scheme liability.” See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 263, at 4; see also
supra notes 119-52 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 10b-5 scheme liability).
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It should be noted that, although §17(a) uses parallel language to Rule
10b-5, it does not use the word “make” in connection with material misstatements or omissions, but rather prohibits “obtain[ing] money or property” in
connection therewith.266
Although Janus specifically dealt with the private Rule 10b-5 right of
action, the impact on the public right of action was immediately manifested;
within a month of the decision, the SEC withdrew several primary Rule 10b-5
claims against corporate executives and substituted aiding and abetting claims
instead.267 The SEC noted in its withdrawal papers that, due to the Janus
Court’s focus on the definition of “make” in Rule 10b-5(b), the decision in no
way affected the analysis under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c).268
In SEC v. Kelly,269 Janus’ threat to government enforcement efforts became realized.270 In Kelly, the SEC asserted scheme liability claims under
Rule 10b-5 and §17(a) of the 1933 Act against America Online Inc. executives who, the SEC claimed, “engineered, oversaw, and executed a scheme to
artificially and materially inflate the Company’s reported online advertising
revenue.”271 The district court dismissed the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 claims, holding that Rule 10b-5 scheme liability is inapplicable where the alleged
scheme’s “primary purpose and effect . . . is to make a public misrepresentation or omission[.]”272 The court also dismissed the § 17(a) claims, opining
that § 17(a) was “essentially the same” as Rule 10b-5, despite the difference
in language.273

266. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
267. HOWARD, supra note 263, at 2 (citing SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA,

Inc., 6:09-cv-01963, 2011 WL 3759916 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2011); Docket entry no.
83 (July 28, 2011) in that same matter)).
268. See id. (citing Big Apple Consulting, 2011 WL 3759916, Mot. for Leave to
File a First Am. Compl. by S.E.C).
269. 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
270. See, e.g., Gregory S. Bruch & James C. Dugan, District Court, Applying
Janus Broadly, Rules Against the SEC in Securities Fraud Case, 4 FIN. FRAUD L. REP.
156, 156 (2012).
271. Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3, Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (No. 08-cv-04612); see
HOWARD, supra note 263, at 2.
272. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343; see also HOWARD, supra note 263, at 3.
273. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345; see also HOWARD, supra note 263 (noting that,
two weeks after the Kelly decision, the SEC filed suit in SEC v. Sells, No. 11-cv04941, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112450 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012), asserting scheme
liability (with no allegations of misstatements or omissions) under Rule 10b-5 and §
17(a) against two sales executives); Complaint, Sells, 2012 WL 3242551). Sells held
that the SEC had alleged violations “beyond the making of material misstatements or
omissions” and that Janus did not prohibit scheme liability claims under Rule 10b5(a) and (c). Sells, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112450, at *20-21 (citing SEC v. Lucent
Technologies, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 359-60 (D.N.J. 2009)). Sells further held
that Janus was inapplicable to claims under § 17(a). Id. at *22.
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Shortly after Kelly, the SEC’s Chief Administrative Law Judge followed
the Kelly court’s analysis, opining that Janus prohibits scheme liability involving misstatements under Rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) where the defendant was
not the maker of the misstatement.274 The judge also held that despite the
difference in language, the standard for primary liability under §17(a) and
Rule 10b-5 was the same.275 Thereafter, the Central District of California in
SEC v. Perry276 agreed that Janus is applicable to SEC claims under both §
17(a) and Rule 10b-5.277
Other courts have refused to extend Janus to SEC enforcement actions.
For example, in SEC v. Daifotis,278 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that Janus was inapplicable to suits under
§ 17(a) and also under § 34(b) of the 1940 Act, but applied Janus to the
SEC’s Rule 10b-5(b) claims.279 The court stressed that “Janus was not a
touchstone to change myriad laws that happen to use the word ‘make’ – it

274. In re Flannery, Release No. 438, 42-43, 42 n.69 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011); see,
e.g., HOWARD, supra note 263, at 3-4; Bruch & Dugan, supra note 270, at 159.
275. In re Flannery, Release No. 438, at 42 n.70; see HOWARD, supra note 263, at
4; see also, e.g., Ethan Brown, ‘Janus Capital’ Will Likely Provide Powerful Defense
Against SEC, WEINGARTEN BROWN LLP (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.wbllp.com
/blog/archives/2011/11 (“This decision is significant because it suggests that there is
increasing momentum for an expansive view of Janus Capital, applying it broadly
against the SEC and to Section 17(a) in addition to 10(b). . . . As a result, Janus Capital appears increasingly to provide defendants with a powerful defense against the
SEC.”).
276. SEC v. Perry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76018, at *21-22 (C.D. Cal. May 31,
2012), partial summary judgment granted by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136596 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 24, 2012) (dismissing remaining claim under § 17(a)(2)).
277. Other courts have applied Janus to Rule 10b-5 claims by the SEC. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28,
2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011).
Further, after the Janus opinion was issued, the SEC on its own accord withdrew
certain claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and substituted aiding and abetting
claims. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
278. No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); see
also HOWARD, supra note 263.
279. Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6. Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any
untrue statement of a material fact in any registration statement, application, report, account,
record, or other document filed or transmitted.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2006) (emphasis added). The court also noted that Janus’
“stringent reading of the word ‘make’ followed from the Court’s prior decisions limiting the scope of implied private rights of action under Rule 10b-5, and the same rationale does not apply in the context of Section 34(b) because there is already no
private right of action under Section 34(b) claims.” Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at
*6; see also Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gumer, supra note 262.
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was a decision interpreting primary liability under Rule 10b-5.”280 The
Northern District of Ohio, in SEC v. Geswein, also ruled that claims under §
17(a), along with Rule 10b-5 scheme liability claims, remain unaffected by
Janus.281 Numerous courts have followed this line of reasoning.282
280. Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6; see also Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gumer, supra note 262; Bruch & Dugan, supra note 286, at 159.
281. No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4565861, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011) (noting that the SEC had conceded that it could not maintain a claim under Rule 10b-5(b)
in light of Janus); see also Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gumer, supra note 262.
282. See, e.g., SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, No. 6:09-cv-1963-Orl-28GJK,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111923 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (noting that the SEC had
withdrawn its claims under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 after the issuance of the Janus
opinion, but holding that Janus was not applicable to claims under §17(a)); SEC v.
Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30,
2012); SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11-cv-116-FtM-29DNF, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26648 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012) (applying Janus to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5(b)
claim, but not to its §17(a) claim); Sells, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112450; SEC v.
Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16402 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2013);
SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that Janus was inapplicable to the SEC’s §17(a)(2) and (3) claims); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No.
5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134580 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011)
(holding that Janus did not bar the SEC’s claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), § 17(a)
or § 14(a) (which prohibits proxy solicitation “by means of” misleading or false
statements)).
Interestingly, the Pentagon district court decision, which held that Janus did
not bar the SEC’s claims under Rule 10b-5 (a) and (c) or § 17(a), created a split in the
Southern District of New York regarding Janus’ applicability to SEC enforcement
actions, as it contradicted Kelly. See, e.g., New Decision Creates Split in Southern
District of New York over Janus Decision, VINCENT & ELKINS (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://www.welaw.com/resources/pub_detail_print.aspx ?id=20661; see also Stoker,
865 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66; SEC v. Garber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57643, at *16 n.50
(S.D.N.Y., Apr. 22, 2013) (noting the split in the district and stating that Janus textually does not extend to scheme liability claims under Rule 10b-5(a), (c) or § 17(a)(1)).
The Pentagon district court noted that, even though Janus did not extend to SEC
enforcement actions or to scheme liability claims, the Pentagon defendants, an investment adviser and its chief executive officer, indisputably had ‘authority over the
content of . . . and whether and how to communicate’ . . . the late trades” at issue.
Pentagon, 844 F. Supp. at 422-23 (citing Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303). Thus, the district
court concluded that “[d]efendants’ ultimate authority over both the content of and the
decision to make late trades as if they had been placed before 4 p.m. is undoubtedly
sufficient under even the more stringent standard articulated in Janus.” Id. at 423.
Without directly addressing the issue of whether Janus applies to SEC enforcement
actions and scheme liability claims, the Second Circuit recently agreed with the district court and rejected the Pentagon defendants’ claims that they could not be held
liable under Janus “because they did not communicate directly with the mutual
funds,” but rather executed trades through their brokers. Pentagon, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16402, at *19. The Second Circuit stated that “[t]o the extent that late trading
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The confusion caused by Janus is most surely affecting the SEC’s securities fraud enforcement efforts. For example, in February 2012, the SEC
settled a high-profile case against two former Bear Stearns executives who
allegedly deceived investors regarding hedge funds that were heavily invested
in subprime mortgage-backed securities.283 This settlement followed the
executives’ claim that, pursuant to Janus, they could not, as a matter of law,
be liable for misstatements in monthly reports to investors for which they did
not have “ultimate authority” because they merely assisted in the preparation
of such reports.284 The defendants also argued that scheme liability was inapplicable.285 Although many factors likely influenced the SEC’s decision to
settle, it is telling that the federal district judge presiding over the case noted
that the case was being “settled for, relatively speaking, chump change.”286 If
this lowball settlement was due in any respect to Janus’ flawed opinion, and
if it is a harbinger of Janus-influenced lowball settlements to come, legislators and regulators should act to restore effective enforcement efforts.

B. Statements by Executives and Other Employees – Who has “Ultimate Authority”?
Janus left many questions unanswered regarding who has “ultimate
authority” within a corporate entity;287 the expected flood of litigation has
requires a ‘statement’ in the form of a transmission to a clearing broker, we find that
in this case, . . . [the defendants] were as much ‘makers’ of the statements as were the
brokers . . . . The brokers may have been responsible for the act of communication,
but . . . [defendants] retained ultimate control over both the content of the communication and the decision to late trade.” Id. at 20 (finding that defendants’ conduct
“violated all three subsections of Rule 10b-5, not just subsection (b), which was the
only subsection at issue in Janus”).
283. Peter Lattman, Bear Stearns Ex-Managers to Pay $1 Million to Settle Fraud
Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Feb. 13, 2012, 9:51 a.m.), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2012/02/13/bear-stearns-ex-managers-to-pay-1-million-to-settle-s-e-c-case/.
284. See, e.g., Ex-Bear Stearns Execs Ask Judge to Narrow SEC, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUS. (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20111221/FINANCE
/111229968.
285. Id.
286. Lattman, supra note 283. Pursuant to the settlement, one executive will
disgorge $700,000 in unlawful gains, pay a penalty of $100,000, and be banned for
the securities industry for three years; the other will disgorge $200,000 in unlawful
gains, pay a penalty of $50,000, and be banned for two years. Id.; Court Approves
SEC Settlements with Two Former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Portfolio Managers;
SEC Bars Managers from Regulated Industries, SEC Litigation Release No. 22398
(June 24, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22398.htm (noting
that the executives did not admit or deny the SEC’s allegations).
287. See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Decision May Limit Scope of Persons who Can
Be Primarily Liable for Securities Fraud Under Rule 10b-5, KING & SPALDING (June
16, 2011) [hereinafter King & Spalding Client Alert] http://www.kslaw.com
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already begun, with varying results. As set forth below, some courts have
held that Janus applies only to secondary actors and does not apply to corporate insiders at all. Other courts have held that Janus is applicable to corporate insiders, but the decisions vary widely in their analyses.

1. Courts Holding that Janus’ “Ultimate Authority” Test Does Not
Apply to Corporate Insiders
With respect to courts holding that Janus does not apply to corporate insiders, some have taken a “group pleading”288 approach in determining who
makes a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5. For example, the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado explained in Touchstone
Group, LLC v. Rink289 that “Janus involved a statement drafted by one organization on behalf of another such that the latter had ultimate authority over
the statement” and that “[s]uch hierarchy does not apply in the case of a
group-published statement published collectively by a corporation’s directors
and officers.”290
Other courts that have rejected the group pleading doctrine291 have
nonetheless found Janus’ ultimate authority test to be inapplicable to corpo/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca061611b.pdf; 2012 Year-End Securities
Litigation Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com
/publications/pages/2012-Year-End-Securities-Litigation-Update.aspx.
288. The group pleading doctrine allows a presumption that group-published
statements, such as those contained in press releases and annual reports, are attributable to those officers and directors within a corporate entity that have daily control or
involvement with respect to ordinary company operations. See, e.g., In re Merck Co.
Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., MDL No. 1658, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87578, at
*19 (D. N.J. Aug. 8, 2011). Many courts have held that the group pleading doctrine
did not survive the heightened pleading requirements instituted by the PSLRA. See
infra note 291 and accompanying text.
289. 913 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Colo. 2012).
290. Id. at 1079. The court also noted that, using the Janus analysis, the plaintiff
had adequately alleged that two of the defendants had ultimate authority over the
statements at issue, as they were the company’s chief legal counsel and chief financial
officer, and “it appear[ed] likely that they possessed ultimate authority over any
statement that they prepared or for which they were otherwise responsible.” Id.
291. A decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York noted that “each circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue” prior to
Janus held that the group pleading doctrine did not survive the PSLRA. In re UBS
AG Secs. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141449 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
28, 2012) (citing decisions from the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits rejecting the
doctrine, but noting that the Tenth Circuit applied the doctrine without discussing
whether it survived the PSLRA). The UBS court noted that, although the majority of
district courts in the Southern District of New York held before Janus that the doctrine survived the PSLRA, numerous decisions have since found that the doctrine did
not survive Janus. Id. at *30-31.
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rate officers and have allowed liability where misstatements can be attributed
to such officers.292 For example, the Merck court explained that the defendant officer made the statements attributed to him “pursuant to his responsibility and authority to act as an agent of Merck, not as in Janus, on behalf of
some separate and independent entity.”293 The court explained that Janus
“certainly cannot be read to restrict liability for Rule 10b-5 claims against
corporate officers to instances in which a plaintiff can plead, and ultimately
prove, that those officers—as opposed to the corporation itself—had ‘ultimate
authority over the statement.”294 Such a reading, “[t]aken to its logical conclusion, … would absolve corporate officers of primary liability for all Rule
10b-5 claims, because ultimately, the statements are within the control of the
corporation which [sic] employs them.”295
Likewise, in Sawant v. Ramsey,296 the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut upheld a jury instruction that stated that one is a
“maker” of a statement if he is “involved with the production or dissemination of the statement, such as through drafting, producing, reviewing, or assisting with the preparation of the statement.”297 Quoting Merck, the Sawant
court explained that Janus “did not alter the well-established rule that a corporation can act only through its employees and agents.”298

292. See infra Part V(D) (discussing how the lower courts have addressed the
issue of attribution).
293. In re Merck, 2011 WL 34444199 at *25.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. No. 3:07-cv-980, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112151 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2012).
297. Id. at *41; see also In re Fannie May 2008 Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 2d 458
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that “[i]n the post-Janus world, an executive may be held
accountable where the executive had ultimate authority over the company’s statement; signed the company’s statement; ratified and approved the company’s statement; or where the statement is attributed to the executive” (emphasis supplied)).
298. Id. at *42-43 (quoting Merck, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *25) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because of the obvious fact of a corporation’s dependence on its employees, an issue arises as to what constitutes scienter on behalf of
a corporation; courts are split regarding the applicability of the “collective scienter
doctrine,” which imputes the scienter of employees to issuers. See, e.g., King &
Spaulding Client Alert, supra note 287; In re Merck, 2011 WL 3444199, at *29 (finding that the complaint adequately alleged that the scienter of two officers could be
imputed to the corporation). For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Browing
Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 523-29 (2013) (noting three lines of
cases with respect to the collective scienter doctrine: a “strong” version, in which the
combined knowledge of all corporate employees may be imputed to a corporation
without identifying the scienter of a specific individual; a “limited” version, in which
the scienter of an identified managerial employee may be imputed even though such
employee did not “make” the alleged misstatement; and a rejection of the doctrine
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Courts holding that Janus’ ultimate authority test does not apply to corporate insiders seem to be in the clear minority.299 However, until the issue is
uniformly resolved through the appellate process, ambiguity remains for investors, corporate insiders and issuers.

2. Courts Holding that Janus’ “Ultimate Authority” Test Applies to
Corporate Insiders
A majority of courts addressing the issue have held that Janus’ ultimate
authority standard applies to corporate insiders, but such courts have been
inconsistent in their application of this standard.300 As such, ambiguity remains in these jurisdictions as well.
An early and often-cited case applying the ultimate authority standard to
corporate insiders, Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole,301 explained that Janus’ “interpretation of the verb ‘to make’ is an interpretation
of the statutory language in question in this case, and therefore cannot be
ignored simply because the defendants are corporate insiders.”302 Applying
that rationale, the Hawaii Ironworkers court held that the plaintiff had failed
to state a Rule 10b-5 claim against the defendants, who allegedly manipulated
accounting figures “in response to a mandatory directive” to increase profit
margins and to “ensure their continued employment,” because such defendants did not have ultimate authority over such statements.303
Likewise, in Red River v. Mariner Systems, Inc.,304 a chief financial officer allegedly used unsubstantiated numbers in financial statements because
he was concerned he would be fired if he did not do so; the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona held that plaintiff’s allegations were
insufficient to demonstrate that the officer had ultimate authority over the
statements.305 However, the Red River court held that plaintiffs had adequately pled that another officer made statements where he allegedly “calculated and adjusted key numbers for the financial statements” and “had direct
involvement in the preparation of false and misleading revenue projections
and a business plan.”306
In a slightly different scenario, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that “an executive who undisputably exaltogether, allowing scienter to be imputed only where the individual who made the
misstatement also possessed the required scienter).
299. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 298, at 510-11.
300. See, e.g., id. at 510-20.
301. No. 3:10CV371, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011).
302. Id. at *10.
303. Id. at *14-15.
304. No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90959 (D. Ariz. June 29,
2012).
305. Id. at *17.
306. Id. at *17-18 (internal quotations omitted).
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ercised authority over his own [internal] non-casual statements with the intent
and reasonable expectation that such statement would be relayed to the investing public should be deemed to be the person who ‘made’ the statements
to the investing public (so long as it is proven that the statement was made to
the investing public).”307 The Daifotis defendant made statements on an internal conference call with employees, who were financial consultants, but
prefaced his remarks with a statement that the purpose of the call was to provide information that the consultants could pass on to their clients.308 But in
Curry v. Hansen Medical, Inc.,309 allegations that a senior vice president who
took actions to alter the company’s recognition of revenue were insufficient
to demonstrate Rule 10b-5(b) liability where the court found that plaintiffs
did not allege that the officer “made” any statements. 310 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that plaintiffs’ allegations that, “as a result of the decisions … [the officer] took to manipulate
… [the company’s] financial results, he made it necessary and inevitable that
false and misleading statements” would be communicated to investors were
insufficient to state a claim.311 Plaintiffs’ arguments that, because the officer
was a disclosure committee member, he was responsible for accurate press
releases and filings were also unavailing.312
Numerous other courts have applied Janus’ ultimate authority standard
to corporate insiders, with varying results.313 As discussed more fully in Part
V(D), the issue of attribution is closely tied with the analysis of who has “ultimate authority” over a statement within a corporation, and there are numerous opinions regarding corporate insiders’ liability for signing or not signing

307. SEC v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 2d 870, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
308. Id. at 880-81.
309. No. C 09-5094 CW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112449 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10,

2012).
Id. at *12-14.
Id. at *12-13.
Id. at *13.
See, e.g., Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 716 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2013);
SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16402 (2d Cir. N.Y.
2013); SEC v. Garber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57643 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013); In re
Longtop Fin. Tech. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91004 (S.D.N.Y. June 29,
2012); SEC v. Greenstone Holdings, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44192 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 28, 2012); In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Cartner, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011); City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc.,
814 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gumer, supra note
262; Joseph B. Crace & Matthew M. Curley, District Courts Grapple with U.S. Supreme Court’s Janus Decision, THOMPSON REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2011, available at
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com
/Securities/Insight/2011/10__October/District_courts_grapple_with_U_S_Supreme
_Court’s_Janus_decision/;
Jeffries, supra note 298, at 510-20.
310.
311.
312.
313.
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public documents.314 Not surprisingly, the courts have been inconsistent in
their approaches to this issue as well. Given the subtle variations in the fact
patterns of each case, and the ambiguities inherent in the Janus standard, it is
difficult to draw the “bright line” that Justice Thomas had hoped would be so
evident.

C. Statements by Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries
Conflicting decisions have also arisen regarding whether a parent corporation can be liable for the misstatements of its wholly-owned subsidiary.315
In City of Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v. Energy Solutions, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that a parent could face Rule 10b-5 liability for the statements of its whollyowned subsidiary because the parent had “control over the content of the
message, the underlying subject matter of the message, and the ultimate decision of whether to communicate the message.”316 The court rejected the parent entity’s claim that it could not be liable under Janus because it was a legally distinct entity and because the allegedly misleading registration statements were attributed to its subsidiary, not to it.317 Distinguishing Janus, the
court held that, unlike the Manager in Janus, the parent, which was the selling
shareholder in both of the offerings at issue, was the sole owner of shares in
the subsidiary at the time of the initial public offering and planned to retain a
controlling interest thereafter.318 Further, the registration statements referenced the subsidiary’s agreement to indemnify the parent for material misstatements or omissions contained therein.319 As such, the parent had “ultimate authority” over the alleged misstatements.320
However, in a subsequent decision, a different judge from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that “it follows from Janus that Rule 10b-5 liability for a one-hundred percent shareholder of an entity ‘making’ a misleading statement is inappropriate; rather,

314. See infra Part V(D).
315. See Youngwood, Angiolillo & Gumer, supra note 262; Farris, supra note 48,

n.2 (noting that typically, the parent company is the listed company and would be
responsible for statements in its prospectuses regarding its subsidiaries and that, if the
subsidiary were the publicly traded issuer, then that issuer would presumably be responsible under Janus for statements in its prospectuses regarding its parent and its
subsidiaries).
316. 814 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18; see also, e.g., Youngwood, Angiolillo & Gumer,
supra note 262; Crace & Curley, supra note 313. See generally Farris, supra note 48.
317. City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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section 20(a) is the appropriate source of liability.”321 The Optimal court
explained that the “[p]laintiffs’ attempt to avoid Janus by conflating shareholder control with ‘ultimate authority’” was unavailing, since the board of
the subsidiary had the ultimate authority to issue the misleading documents in
question, and not the parent.322 The fact that the parent had the authority to
select the subsidiary’s board did not change the court’s analysis.323
As with the analysis regarding corporate insiders discussed above in Part
V(B), a post-Janus bright line seems elusive in the parent/ subsidiary context
as well. Further, as with the corporate insider analysis, the issue of attribution
is closely tied with the determination of parent liability. Ambiguities regarding the attribution analysis are discussed in Part V(D) below.

D.

Determining Express and Implied Attribution

Lower courts applying Janus have varied widely in their interpretation
of Janus’ statement that “in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement
or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by – and only by – the party to whom it is attributed.”324
321. In re Optimal U.S. Litig., No. 10 CIV 4095 SAS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119141, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011); see Youngwood, Angiolillo & Gumer,
supra note 262.
322. In re Optimal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119141 at *16-17.
323. Id. Likewise, in Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th
Cir. 2011), the court noted in dicta that even though trust documents provided that the
defendant entity was responsible for the filings of the trust, such provision did “not
demonstrate . . . [that the defendant] had ‘ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.’” Id. at 693 n.8 (quoting
Janus Captial Grp. v. First Derivative Trader, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (emphasis
omitted)).
324. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. Janus’ holding that statements in mutual fund
prospectuses cannot be attributed to investment managers is particularly problematic.
As articulately posited in the Law Professors’ Amici Brief:
Investment managers themselves strive consciously to form a public connection between
themselves and their funds. When forming a
new fund, the manager typically selects a name
that blazons the manager’s brand upon the new
fund by incorporating the manager’s name into
the fund’s name. Hence, at each of the putatively autonomous funds at issue here features
“Janus” in its name. Investment managers take
direct and voluntary measures to persuade the
marketplace to attribute the performance of
their funds to the operations of their managers.
The marketplace, in turn, reasonably does so. .
. . As an empirical matter, the marketplace
demonstrated its widespread attribution of
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Further confusing courts is Janus’ statement that “[m]ore may be required to
find that a person or entity made a statement indirectly, but attribution is necessary.”325 This section surveys some of the caselaw developing regarding
the attribution issue.
A substantial body of case law has developed regarding whether signatories of documents containing allegedly misleading statements are the “makers” of such statements under Janus. A clear majority of courts examining
this issue under various factual scenarios have held that such signatories can
be held liable under Rule 10b-5(b).326 However, in certain limited circumfund statements to investment managers: upon
the public allegation of market timing in mutual funds, stock prices of the accused managers fell rapidly.
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *8-9 (citing Riva D. Atlas, Janus
Capital Meets the Enemy and It Is Janus, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at C1 (commenting that Janus Capital lost “more than 20 percent of market value of its shares in
recent weeks”)); see also, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *29-32. It
should be noted that, as a practical matter, it is commonplace in the market for issuers
to use a legend on prospectuses and offering materials in which they expressly acknowledge their responsibility for most statements contained therein. See, e.g., Farris,
supra note 48, n.12 (noting also that “[u]nderwriters typically provide in underwriting
agreements that the only statements attributable to them concern their name and address and the amount of the concession or reallowance in a public equity offering”).
Further, market professionals are typically careful to prohibit reliance on any statement not contained in the prospectus. See, e.g., id. In light of the Janus decision,
issuers may attempt to “reallocate attribution of some such statements to bankers,
accountants, lawyers, industry research firms or other market participants . . . .” Id. It
is difficult to predict whether issuers will be successful in overcoming the inertia of
past practice.
325. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.11; see supra note 190. One commentator has
noted that the Court “mistakenly appeared to believe that absent attribution, a statement is not even made.” Redwood, supra note 181, at 486 (emphasis added) (“If the
Court wishes to hold, after Stoneridge, that a misstatement which never comes to the
attention of the plaintiff is not one on which the plaintiff can be said to have relied,
and then to deny recovery on that basis, that is one thing. But that does not mean that
a misstatement was not actually made by the defendant, and the Court should not
conflate what are in fact two separate elements of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action.”).
326. See, e.g., In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 2d
277 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); SEC v. Merkin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155679 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
2, 2012); In re Longtop Fin. Tech. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91004
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 04 Civ. 9866
(LTS)(HBP), 05 MD 1688 (LTS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39454 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,
2012); SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2012); City of Roseville Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v.
Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011); SEC
v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011); In re Merck Co.
Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., MDL No. 1658, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87578, at
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stances, courts have found that signatory status is not enough to confer liability.327
Further, courts have differed on whether an entity’s inclusion on an offering document cover page is sufficient to allege Rule 10b-5(b) liability. For
example, the Optimal court held that a defendant’s inclusion on the cover
page of fund explanatory memoranda “alongside several other support professionals—including auditors, lawyers and custodians” was insufficient to
establish liability under Janus.328 However, Scott v. ZST Digital Networks,
Inc. held that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged Rule 10b-5 liability against an
underwriter whose name was “featured prominently on the offering documents” and who was alleged to be “the architect of the fraud.”329
Other courts have found express attribution in the context of advertisements and press releases. For example, in SEC v. Daifotis, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California denied a defendant officer’s motion for summary judgment with respect to fund advertising that included his picture and a quote attributed to him.330 The court held that, even
though the officer claimed that “’he did not give’ the quote and ‘did not recall’ seeing the advertisement,” the express attribution in the advertisement
was sufficient to present the matter to a jury.331 Further, SEC v. Carter held
that attribution was appropriately alleged where a press release quoted the

*19 (D. N.J. Aug. 8, 2011); Jeffries, supra note 298, at 518-20 (discussing whether
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 certification constitutes express attribution).
327. See Ho v. Duoyuan Global Water, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 547, 576-77
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege that audit
documents signed by “Grant Thorton” could be attributed to Grant Thornton International, Ltd., “an umbrella organization comprised of independent registered public
accounting firms world-wide,” rather than its member firm, GT-Hong Kong, and
stating that “[t]he fact that two parties share a similar name is not indicative that both
may be held liable for the alleged misstatements, even if GTIL and GT-HK share
close business ties”); see also Merck, 2011 WL 3444199, at *28 (holding that allegations that an officer made actionable misrepresentations by signing certain SEC filings that were “knowingly or recklessly misleading based on their access to information that contradicted Merck’s public statements” were insufficient under the PSLRA
to plead scienter). Further, some argue that Sarbanes-Oxley § 302 certifications are
not always indicative of ultimate authority. Jeffries, supra note 298, at 518-20.
328. In re Optimal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119141, at *23-24.
329. 896 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889-90 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing In re Allstate Life Ins.
Co. Litig., Nos. CV–09–8162–PCT–GMS, CV–09–8174–PCT–GMS, 2012 WL
176497 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 2012) (holding that a claim under Janus had been stated
against underwriters whose names were prominent and in bold type on the first
page)); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enterprises, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828 (S.D. Ohio
2012) (stating that private placement memoranda with defendant’s name prominently
displayed on the front pages could be a “shared product”)).
330. 874 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877-78 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
331. Id.
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defendant, listed him as the contact person and was attached to a Form 8-K
signed by him.332
More complex scenarios arise in connection with claims of “implicit” attribution. For example, in City of Roseville, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that even though allegedly misleading registration statements were expressly attributed to a subsidiary, such
statements could also be implicitly attributed to the parent corporation as
well.333 The court reasoned that “[a] reasonable jury could find that, on the
basis of the facts alleged..., [the parent’s] role went well beyond that of ‘a
speechwriter draft[ing] a speech….”334 Likewise, in SEC v. Garber, an attorney advisory opinion stating that certain debts could be converted to unrestricted stock certificates was attributable to defendants because they “solicited the advisory opinion and had ‘ultimate authority…over whether and how
to communicate it,’ at least in the context of the alleged scheme.”335 Further,
SEC v. Carter held that the SEC had properly alleged attribution to defendant
of a press release that was drafted by others in reliance on allegedly misleading information supplied by him; the fact that defendant allegedly reviewed
and approved the releases before they were issued and was listed as a contact
person was sufficient to allege that he was a “speaker.”336 Other courts have
found implicit attribution under a variety of factual scenarios. 337
In sum, once again, it is hard to find the bright line with respect to the
post-Janus caselaw. Legislators and regulators should remedy the ambiguities caused by Janus’ abstruse attribution language. In the interim, more confusing and conflicting lower court decisions can be expected.

332. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599.
333. City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d

395, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
334. Id. (citing Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302).
335. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57643, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013).
336. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599, at *3-4, 6-7.
337. See, e.g., Red River v. Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90959, at *17-18 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012); In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec.
Litig., Nos. 04 Civ. 9866(LTS)(HBP), 05 MD 1688(LTS), 2012 WL 983548, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Jeffries, supra note 298, at 515-16. However, implicit attribution was rejected
in Reese, where the court noted in dicta that a trust’s SEC filings were not attributable
to the defendant entity, even though the trust documents provided that the defendant
entity was responsible for the filings of the trust. Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska)
Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 693 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). Likewise, In re DVI Inc. Securities Litigation rejected the implicit attribution of statements in a client’s Form 10-Q to a law
firm. No. 03-5336, 2013 WL 56083 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2013).
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E. Liability Under §20(b)
As intimated by the Janus dissent, liability under §20(a), which is dependent on a primary violation, will be greatly curtailed with the reality of
fewer possible “makers” capable of making such a primary violation.338
Thus, because the Janus Court reserved the issue of liability under §20(b), it
is expected that this issue will soon be working its way through the lower
courts.339 Although plaintiffs have begun asserting §20(b) claims, only a
couple of reported decisions have referenced such claims.
For example, in City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement System
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the plaintiff’s §20(b) claims because the
complaint did “not allege any plausible alternative theory where defendants
are not primary violators and yet can still be held liable on a secondary violation theory through controlling” the corporate defendant.340 As such, the
court did “not address the defendants’ argument that Section 20(b) does not
create a private right of action that plaintiff can assert.”341 Additionally,
Jackson v. Fischer held that, because there were no “viable allegation[s] of
primary liability,” plaintiff’s §20(b) must be dismissed.342
As noted by the Janus dissent, §20(b) “has been thought largely superfluous in 10b-5 cases,” and, as such, “[t]here is a dearth of authority construing §20(b).”343 Congress should act to bring clarity to the area.

VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FIXES
A legislative and regulatory response is necessary to correct the damage
caused by the trilogy of decisions discussed herein and to provide investors
with the level of redress envisioned by the seventy-third Congress, which
faced the widespread financial abuses endemic in the economic disaster of the
Great Depression. As noted by then-Commissioner Walter, “it is critical to
investors, our securities markets, and our economy overall that these laws
remain fully enforceable.”344
Simply stated, it should not be the law in the United States in 2013 that
a deceitful manager can potentially coordinate every essential aspect of a
338. See, e.g., King & Spaulding Client Alert, supra note 287.
339. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, supra

note 202, at 6, 61).
340. 875 F. Supp. 2d 359, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
341. Id.
342. No. C 11-2753 PJH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36327, at *25-26 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
15, 2013).
343. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 5B JACOBS, supra
note 219, §§ 11-8, 11-72) (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. Walter, supra note 35 (emphasis added); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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mutual fund for fraudulent purposes, while it reaps increased fees, hides its
deceit and avoids private Rule 10b-5(b) liability. Given the high percentage
of the population relying on mutual funds for retirement support, the uncertain state of Social Security reserves, and the historic level of government
deficits, action should be taken.
Policy arguments on both sides of the issue of whether to restore preCentral Bank Rule 10b-5 liability center primarily around concerns with respect to securities class actions in general, including whether such suits effectively deter securities fraud, whether injured investors are adequately compensated, and how such suits affect the capital markets.345
As has been noted above, in this era of slashed regulatory budgets, it is
important that the private right of action be firmly established in order to effectively combat securities fraud.346 Although it is true that private plaintiffs
may pursue certain expressly-enumerated causes of action against violators of
the securities laws,347 said provisions do not offer the breadth of the preCentral Bank private Rule 10b-5 right. Further, state law avenues have been
greatly curtailed by the SLUSA.348 Finally, although the Fair Funds provision of Sarbanes-Oxley349 allows the SEC to distribute monetary penalties to
aggrieved investors in the small number of cases that it has the resources to
prosecute, such amounts “cannot necessarily make the victims [of such
frauds] whole.”350 In this light, this Article suggests the following legislative
and regulatory solutions.

345. GAO Study, supra note 6, at 38. For an excellent analysis of arguments on
both sides of the issue, see id. at 37-45.
346. See, e.g., id. at 6.
347. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of
current secondary liability provisions applicable to attorneys, investment banks, accountants, credit rating agencies, and securities analysts, see GAO Study, supra note
6, at 30-37; see also, e.g., Stephen M. Sinalko & Maten Koch, “Janus Capital” and
Underwriter Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, NEW YORK LAW
JOURNAL, July 12, 2011.
348. See supra note 111; see, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 26, 30. SLUSA
generally limits state causes of action for secondary liability to individual plaintiffs or
classes of fifty or fewer. GAO Study, supra note 6, at 30 (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii) (2006)).
349. See, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 27. Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in
2002 to protect investors following several highly publicized accounting scandals.
See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
350. Walter, supra note 35. Prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, monies
were only distributed to aggrieved investors if there was a disgorgement order; however, the Dodd-Frank Act added a provision to allow the SEC to distribute monetary
penalties to investors where there is no disgorgement order. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)
(Supp. V 2011); GAO Study, supra note 6, at 28.
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A. Congress Could Amend §10 and §20
With respect to private aiding and abetting liability, Congress could
simply revise §20 of the 1934 Act to expressly provide for a private cause of
action, as has been proposed on previous occasions.351 Nothing in the GAO
Study commissioned by the Dodd-Frank Act would prevent Congress from
revising §20 in this manner.
Further, with respect to the harm caused by Janus’ strained interpretation of the word “make” in Rule 10b-5, Congress could revise §10(b) of the
1934 Act to expressly provide for a private cause of action for violations of
§10(b), with a clear definition of “make” based on enumerated factors that
parallel the “substantial participation test”352 or the SEC’s “creation” test,353
rather than Janus’ “ultimate authority” test.354
351. See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. For example, with respect to

the determination of who “makes” a statement, one commentator has proposed a
“benefits test” based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983), and Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). Redwood, supra note 181, at 50810. In Dirks, the Court held that a tippee of inside information is not liable unless the
insider providing such information has breached a duty by disclosing such information and the tippee knew or should have known of such breach; in determining
whether such a breach existed, the Court looks to “whether the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662; see also
Redwood, supra note 181, at 508-09. Similarly, in Pinter, in determining who is a
“seller” or “solicitor,” the Supreme Court held that “liability extends only to the person who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to
serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner.” Pinter, 486 U.S. at
647; see also Redwood, supra note 181, at 510. Thus, the proposed “benefits test”
with respect to the “maker” of a statement would provide: “A ‘maker’ would include
not merely the actual person who issues the false statement . . . but also any other
related party who, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial
interests, was in a position to promote or influence the creation and distribution of the
misleading statements.” Redwood, supra note 181, at 510 (emphasis added).
354. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the DoddFrank Act amended § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i, captioned “Manipulation of
Security Prices” to add two provisions that call into question the Janus Court’s definition of “make” in Rule 10b-5. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(d), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4), (f)); see also Pekarek & Shingle, supra note 193;
Harriet B. Alexson, Intermediaries in Securities Transactions: Changes Under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, HARRIET B. ALEXSON
L. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.alexsonlaw.com/blog/intermediaries-in-securitiestransactions-changes-under-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumerprotection-act/. Specifically, § 9(a)(4) provides that a dealer or broker may not “make
. . . any statement” that is materially misleading for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of a security, and § 9(f) provides for a private right of action against
anyone who “willfully participates” in any act in violation of § 9(a), (b) or (c). 15
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As noted in the GAO Study, various commentators have proposed legislation for secondary actors that would incorporate liability limits with respect
to such actors.355 For example, one commentator has proposed a liability
ceiling for secondary actors, which would deter fraudulent conduct, while
keeping liability insurance premiums at a reasonable level and obviating the
need for in terrorum settlements.356 This expert proposed a ceiling of $2 million for individuals and $50 million for public corporations.357
Another proposal is to limit fraud-on-the-market damages to further the
goal of deterrence, rather than compensation; such proposal would require
defendants to disgorge their gains or expected gains and would not impose
responsibility for all losses caused by the fraudulent activity.358 Finally, some
have proposed that aiding and abetting liability be limited to proportionate
liability for those secondary actors with actual knowledge or intent to defraud.359
As previously discussed throughout this Article, Congress should act to
protect investors left potentially vulnerable in the trilogy’s aftermath.

B. The SEC Could Amend Rule 10b-5
An alternative to congressional amendment of §10(b) would be administrative amendment of Rule 10b-5. Because the Janus Court referred only to
Rule 10b-5 in its analysis, and not §10(b), it is possible that the SEC could
amend the language of Rule 10b-5 to include persons who “create”, or “substantially participate in the making of” a material misstatement or omission,
rather than merely those who “make” a material misstatement or omission.
However, because the Janus Court purported to anchor its decision on Central Bank and Stoneridge, which had nothing to do with the definition of the

U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4),(f) (emphasis added). The act of “willfully participat[ing]” in
“mak[ing]” a misstatement seems to include more actors than the “maker” with ultimate authority, leaving quite a conundrum for lower courts presented with this provision. See, e.g., Alexson, supra (noting that “‘willingly participates’ is not defined[]”
and that there is “no requirement in Section 9(f) that the willing participant have
knowledge of the false statement, an intent to misrepresent a material fact, or even a
careless disregard of the facts given to offerees”); Pekarek & Shingle, supra note 193.
355. GAO Study, supra note 6, at 37-45.
356. Id. at 44 (citing Evaluating S.1551: The Liability for Aiding and Abetting
Securities Violations Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Liability Hearing]
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.)).
357. Id. (citing Liability Hearing, supra note 356 (statement of John C. Coffee)).
358. See id. at 45 (citing Liability Hearing, supra note 356 (statement of Adam C.
Pritchard)).
359. See id.
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word “make” in Rule 10b-5(b), it is unlikely that the SEC would attempt this
course.360

C. The SEC or Congress Could Require Advisors to Sign Fund Filings
If the SEC or Congress were to act to require investment advisers to sign
all fund filings, such advisers would become “makers” of statements contained therein under Janus, and thus subject to Rule 10b-5 liability.361 However, extending this requirement broadly to other secondary actors would be
problematic, as the extent of their individual involvement in the preparation
of such filings may not warrant exposure to primary liability.

D. Rethinking of the Congenial Fund Board/ Adviser Relationship
It has been suggested that mutual fund board members should be cautious after Janus to not rely so heavily on their investment adviser for information critical to their oversight function.362 As has been thoroughly discussed herein, the mutual fund board’s reliance on its investment adviser is a
firmly entrenched matter of practice and doctrine under the 1940 Act, with
the one contemporary instance in which a board fired its adviser being “hailed
as a ‘watershed event for the fund industry.’”363 However, Janus has upset the
proverbial applecart, placing board members in a particularly precarious position.
If Janus is not legislatively and administratively remedied, mutual fund
board members must undertake a critical reanalysis of their relationship with
their investment advisors, with a clear focus on their duties to their shareholders. Such a reanalysis would, without question, dynamically change the
mutual fund industry as a whole.

VII. CONCLUSION
As set forth herein, the Supreme Court’s trilogy of decisions constricting the
Rule 10b-5 right of action has already begun to manifest harmful consequences with respect to private investor suits and agency-driven actions. In
light of the high percentage of the U.S. population relying upon the perceived
360. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 137. Additionally, the Court’s statement that
Rule 10b-5 could not be read to create “a theory of liability similar to – but broader in
application than – what Congress has already created expressly” in § 20(a) would be
prohibitive. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2304 (2011) (internal citations omitted); Pritchard, supra note 9, at 137.
361. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 16.
362. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 171 (“Perhaps fund directors will . . . decide that
their relationship with their fund’s management company deserves to be much less
chummy and more adversarial.”).
363. See id.
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relative safety of mutual fund investments and the unfortunate reality of
slashed regulatory budgets hindering securities fraud enforcement efforts,
remedial action is necessary.. As the nation’s gatekeepers repeatedly demonstrate their fallibility with respect to vulnerable investors, our response cannot
be “caveat emptor” where Rule 10b-5 actions are concerned. For the protection of investors and the capital markets, the Roberts Court’s “pay no attention to the manager behind the mutual fund curtain” dictate should be replaced with meaningful reforms.
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